

Preliminary Transcript

HEARING ON SAFE AND AFFORDABLE BIOTECH
DRUGS: THE NEED FOR A GENERIC PATHWAY

Monday, March 26, 2007

House of Representatives,
Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform,
Washington, D.C.

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Committee Hearings

of the

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES



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7 Committee on Oversight and

8 Government Reform,

9 Washington, D.C.

10 The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in
11 room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Henry
12 A. Waxman [chairman of the committee] presiding.

13 Present: Representatives Waxman, Kucinich, Davis of
14 Illinois, Yarmuth, Norton, Van Hollen, Hodes, Welch, Davis of
15 Virginia, Burton, Issa, Bilbray, and Sali.

16 Staff Present: Phil Barnett, Staff Director and Chief
17 Counsel; Kristin Amerling, General Counsel; Karen Nelson,
18 Health Policy Director; Karen Lightfoot, Communications
19 Director and Senior Policy Advisor; Andy Schneider, Chief
20 Health Counsel; Sarah Despres, Senior Health Counsel; Ann

21 Witt, Health Counsel; Robin Appleberry, Counsel; Earley
22 Green, Chief Clerk; Teresa Coufal, Deputy Clerk; Caren
23 Auchman, Press Assistant; Zhongrui ``JR`` Deng, Chief
24 Information Officer; Leneal Scott, Information Systems
25 Manager; Robin Pam, Staff Assistant; Rachel Sher, Counsel;
26 David Marin, Minority Staff Director; Larry Halloran,
27 Minority Deputy Staff Director; Jennifer Safavian, Minority
28 Chief Counsel for Oversight and Investigations; Susie
29 Schulte, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member; Kristina
30 Husar, Minority Professional Staff Member; Patrick Lyden,
31 Minority Parliamentarian and Member Services Coordinator;
32 Brian McNicoll, Minority Communications Director; and
33 Benjamin Chance, Minority Clerk.

34 Chairman WAXMAN. The meeting of the Committee will
35 please come to order.

36 More than 20 years ago the Congress enacted the
37 Hatch-Waxman Act. That law has taught us three things:
38 genetic drugs are good for patients, both medically and
39 financially; with a little help, the market works, generic
40 competition lowers drug prices; and generic competition does
41 not bankrupt the drug name drug industry or slow innovation.

42 Maybe some big drug makers still dispute these lessons,
43 but no one else does. But there is still no generic
44 competition for one of the fastest-growing and most expensive
45 categories of drugs, biologicals, those drugs produced from
46 living cell cultures rather than from chemical synthesis.

47 Some of these drugs are near miracles for people with
48 cancer, metabolic diseases, and immune disorders. They can
49 stop disability and, in some cases, save life. People need
50 them. But some of these drugs cost each patient tens of
51 thousands of dollars a year. Some can cost hundreds of
52 thousands per year. Many people cannot get access to these
53 near miracles, and even when people can get them the prices
54 drive up the cost of Medicare, Medicaid, and health insurance
55 overall.

56 Why isn't the market helping? It is not because of the
57 patent system that biologicals are protected from the
58 competition that might lower prices. Biologicals, like other

59 | drugs, do enjoy patent protection. This allows manufacturers
60 | to enjoy a monopoly period during which they can get a
61 | significant return on their investments. But patents, or
62 | many of them, have already expired, and other patents are
63 | just about to expire.

64 | And it is not the science of these drugs that protects
65 | them from competition. The technology is already here to
66 | make a safe and effective copy of some biotech drugs.
67 | Moreover, the technology is getting better every year, and we
68 | can make progress even faster if we allow companies to use it
69 | to make generics.

70 | Instead, the monopoly on each of these drugs is
71 | perpetuated by the lack of a clear pathway for FDA to approve
72 | competing versions.

73 | The Hatch-Waxman Act does not reach most of them. This
74 | costs all of us--taxpayers, insurance premium payers, and
75 | patients--billions of dollars. It also means that some very
76 | sick people simply cannot get the drugs they need.

77 | I know that the science of these drugs is not simple. I
78 | take the questions of research, safety, and efficacy very
79 | seriously. The only way we can succeed in establishing
80 | robust competition for biotech drugs is with drugs the
81 | doctors and patients know they can count on, so we need to be
82 | sure that the FDA has the discretion to require the studies
83 | that are needed to establish that a copy of a biotech drug is

84 equivalent to the brand name drug in safety and
85 effectiveness. That is one of the things we hope to learn
86 more about today.

87 But the big brand name companies have gone beyond
88 legitimate concern and have thrown up a defensive smoke
89 screen around biologicals. They say there will be problems
90 of safety, decreased innovation, and limited savings. When
91 discussing creating generic competition, they say things
92 like--and I am going to quote this--''such action may also
93 save consumers a few dollars here and there, although that is
94 by no means assured, but whatever short-term savings may be
95 achieved will come at an enormous long-term cost to the
96 public. Focusing solely upon short-term, lower prices, a
97 cheap drugs policy will inevitably reduce research and hinder
98 our public health efforts.''

99 Well, these arguments have a familiar ring to them.
100 That is because the words I just read were the formal
101 testimony that the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
102 gave to the House in 1983 when they were opposing
103 Hatch-Waxman, and now manufacturers are using these same
104 arguments again. But they were wrong then. Hatch-Waxman has
105 saved patients billions of dollars and dramatically improved
106 their access to drugs, and Hatch-Waxman did not reduce
107 research or hinder public health.

108 And they are wrong now. A new path for FDA to approve

109 generic biologicals will save patients billions in the future
110 and will improve access to treatments and cures, and a new
111 path will improve competition, while preserving the market's
112 strong incentive for research.

113 For the sake of patients, their families, public and
114 private health insurance, and taxpayers, we must find a way
115 to introduce competition to this market. When a patent
116 expires, we owe it to consumers to find a way through
117 competition to lower prices and still deliver a safe and
118 effective product. When a patent expires, they no longer
119 need the product, so the price will make no difference.

120 I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses today
121 and learning more about the scope of the problem, the
122 science, and the potential solutions.

123 [Prepared statement of Chairman Waxman follows:]

124 ***** INSERT *****

125 Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Davis?

126 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
127 holding today's hearing to consider the implications of
128 creating a regulatory pathway for approval of follow-on
129 biologics. It is a very important subject, and certainly
130 your leadership is appreciated and worthy of this Committee's
131 consideration.

132 Mr. Chairman, you have long been a leader in improving
133 access to pharmaceutical drugs. Indeed, there is near
134 universal agreement that the Hatch-Waxman Act has been
135 extremely effective in allowing generic drugs to come to
136 market and compete with brand name drugs. This competition
137 has benefitted countless citizens, as well as the Federal
138 Government, by using natural market economics to bring down
139 the price of prescription medicine. You are to be commended
140 for your leadership in improving access to these life-saving
141 medications.

142 It is my understanding you have recently introduced
143 legislation that would, in fact, create a regulatory pathway
144 for the FDA to approve follow-on biologics. We have been
145 reviewing the legislation with interest, and we expect it
146 will inform today's discussion.

147 I look forward to exploring your proposal further. For
148 now, let me just offer a few preliminary thoughts on this
149 very complex subject.

150 The first principle guiding this effort should be to
151 foster innovation and the discovery of new cures. After all,
152 there is no new therapeutic, by definition there can be no
153 follow-on. Accordingly, we need to protect the intellectual
154 property of innovative firms. Given the high cost of
155 research, development, manufacturing, and regulatory
156 approvals, IP protections are clearly a critical factor for
157 biotech startups when they are securing venture capital and
158 pursuing partnerships with larger firms.

159 Today we will hear from economist Henry Grabowski, who
160 will explain that increased patent uncertainty and IP
161 litigation would have a significant negative effect on
162 capital market decisions for emerging private and public
163 biotech firms. He will explain that if the Federal
164 Government either weakens patent protections or increases the
165 chance of litigation there will likely be a corresponding
166 decrease in investment, and therefore less research and
167 development of biologics. It would be tragic if legislation
168 intended to increase access to medicine would have the
169 unintended result of stifling innovation, preventing the
170 discovery of cures of presently terminal diseases.

171 I hope you would agree with me, Mr. Chairman, about the
172 importance of fostering a vibrant and innovative culture
173 where we encourage our brightest minds and daring
174 entrepreneurs to do the research, provide the investment so

175 | that we may some day discover the cure for cancer or Lou
176 | Gehrig's disease.

177 | Reflecting on the Hatch-Waxman Act, you got it right
178 | when you recognized the importance of balancing the twin
179 | goals of bringing generic drugs to market while at the same
180 | time leaving intact the financial incentive for research and
181 | development.

182 | One of the keys to this successful balance in that
183 | legislation was the guarantee of five years of market
184 | exclusivity for innovative companies. Incidentally, European
185 | Union regulators currently provide ten years of market
186 | exclusivity for European drugs for innovative drugs. Some
187 | amount of market exclusivity for the innovator is necessary
188 | under any regulatory pathway for follow-on biologics.

189 | The second imperative is to provide a mechanism so the
190 | FDA is able to guarantee the safety and efficacy of follow-on
191 | biologics. To do so we have to recognize the fundamental
192 | differences between biologics and chemical-based
193 | pharmaceuticals. What has proven to be successful in the
194 | case of traditional drugs is not necessary transferrable to
195 | the science of biologics. For instance, it is currently
196 | possible to know the complete character of a small molecule
197 | drug. This knowledge enables the FDA to approve generic
198 | drugs with the same characteristics as the innovator drug
199 | without requiring generic companies to test and prove the

200 drug's efficacy and safety again. However, current science
201 has not advanced sufficiently to give us the same confidence
202 that a follow-on biologic is identical to a previously
203 approved biologic based on molecular structure, alone.

204 Unlike traditional drugs, which are chemically based,
205 biologics are made from living organisms. Even minor
206 variations in manufacturing processes can have a significant
207 impact on the final character and consistency of the biologic
208 and its effect on the human body.

209 This diagram on the board comparing a biologic used to
210 treat anemia and a traditional drug that treats peptic ulcers
211 disease demonstrates the difference between traditional
212 chemical drugs and biological therapies. As you can see, the
213 biologic is significantly more complex than a traditional
214 drug, have a molecular weight of 30,000 versus 351. This is
215 a critical distinction between traditional generic drugs and
216 follow-on biologics. Any regulatory pathway must take full
217 account of this distinction, which for now seems to point to
218 the inescapable conclusion that clinical trials on some level
219 will be essential to ensure the safety and efficacy of
220 follow-on biological products.

221 With the, again I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
222 spurring a discussion on this important subject. I look
223 forward to hearing from our distinguished panel of witnesses.

224 [Prepared statement of Mr. Davis of Virginia follows:]

225 ***** INSERT *****

226 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Davis.

227 Without objection, all members will be permitted to
228 enter an opening statement in the record. Do any members
229 wish, however, to make any comments before we hear from our
230 15 witnesses? Mr. Issa?

231 Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. I
232 will put my formal statement in the record, particularly
233 because it sounds an awful lot like Mr. Davis'. The view is
234 somewhat the same, and that is that it is very clear that we
235 know a great deal about chemical compounds and we can say a
236 chemical is a chemical, but, for example, Mr. Chairman, would
237 you want to have these two oranges substituted as though
238 there were no difference? Would you accept that a Florida
239 orange is the same as a California orange if you have to peel
240 it, Mr. Chairman? And, for Mr. Sali who is not here today,
241 do you really think that any Russett potato is an Idaho
242 potato and should be interchanged and have no value, no
243 second testing of whether or not it makes a good french
244 forestry?

245 Now, clearly we know how to make grain alcohol, and if I
246 am buying grain alcohol, Mr. Chairman, it is very clear that
247 I know that it is alcohol plus about 3 percent water that
248 just gets in if you get the air to it. But, Mr. Chairman, do
249 you really think that a \$90 bottle of California wine that
250 says merlot is equal to this fine boxed merlot? And would

251 | you want to go to the dinner table or the hospital and have
252 | them interchanged without your prior approval, or perhaps a
253 | little taste?

254 | This is biologics. These are made by process. Mr.
255 | Chairman, they may both be a merlot, but as a Californian, I
256 | am sure that you would not want them interchanged without
257 | your prior approval.

258 | With that, I yield back.

259 | [Prepared statement of Mr. Issa follows:]

260 | ***** INSERT *****

261 Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Davis?

262 Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would like
263 to make a brief statement.

264 Chairman WAXMAN. Before I recognize you for that
265 purpose, I would like to inquire if you have any props.

266 [Laughter.]

267 Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman is recognized.

268 Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Thank you very much, Mr.
269 Chairman. I shall, indeed, be brief. But first of all let
270 me thank you for calling this hearing.

271 In 1984 the landmark Hatch-Waxman Act provided a
272 cost-effective alternative to branded drugs with the creation
273 of a traditional generic pharmaceutical industry. Today's
274 hearing marks yet another landmark as we are being called
275 upon to address escalating biopharmaceutical costs.

276 This issue is near and dear to me, one, as a former
277 health administrator, but also because my Congressional
278 District has more hospitals and more hospital beds than any
279 other Congressional District in the Country. Illinois has
280 about 200 hospitals, most of them nonprofit. State hospitals
281 are losing money, and another third are barely breaking even,
282 notwithstanding cuts in Medicare and Medicaid.

283 According to Crane's Chicago Business, on February 13,
284 2006, while the State of Illinois has implemented
285 prescription drug assistance programs like the Senior Care

286 Pharmaceutical Program, State Pharmaceutical Assistance Plan,
287 All Kids Program that provides health insurance coverage and
288 prescription drugs to children across all socio-economic
289 groups, they help to buffer costs.

290 However, the sad reality is that cuts in Federal
291 spending tend to shift costs to insured patients and their
292 employers. By definition, health care is eating up a piece of
293 our income, which is especially bad news for the 26 percent
294 of Chicagoans, including 164,203 with full-time jobs and
295 43,876 with at least a college education who lack health
296 insurance. These data are particularly disturbing when you
297 take into consideration the median household income for
298 Chicago is \$38,625 a year.

299 With this in mind, I welcome today's distinguished
300 panelists and look forward to their insight and
301 recommendations on how we can build upon the foundation of
302 generic competition for our consumers laid some 23 years ago
303 under the Hatch-Waxman Act towards the attainment of a
304 pathway to safe and affordable biotech drugs.

305 I guess if I was to have any kind of prop, I'd just take
306 this water, which is pretty pure, and be delighted to have
307 it.

308 Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing.

309 [Prepared statement of Mr. Davis of Illinois follows:]

310 ***** INSERT *****

311 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Davis.

312 Does any other Member wish to be recognized for an
313 opening statement? Mr. Yarmuth?

314 Mr. YARMUTH. Mr. Chairman, two things real briefly.
315 First of all, I hope that Mr. Issa would accept an amendment
316 to his list in saying that no self-respecting Kentuckian
317 would accept Tennessee sour mash whiskey for a Kentucky
318 bourbon.

319 Mr. ISSA. Now that is bipartisan if I ever saw it.

320 Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you.

321 Also, I would like to say that I think the Chairman and
322 Mr. Davis have very accurately expressed and illuminated the
323 conflicting issues that we have to deal with on this topic.

324 I would also mention the fact that we have to recognize
325 that much of the research that leads to the development of
326 these drugs and these medications, both pharmaceutical and
327 also these biologics, are funded by taxpayer dollars
328 initially, so that we have an overriding mandate to do what
329 is best for the taxpayer, who is paying for most of this
330 research at the very foundational levels.

331 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

332 [Prepared statement of Mr. Yarmuth follows:]

333 ***** INSERT *****

334 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much.

335 We will now hear from our witnesses today. Our first
336 witness I am pleased to welcome is Dr. Janet Woodcock. She
337 is the Deputy Commissioner for Operations and Chief Medical
338 Officer of the Food and Drug Administration.

339 Since you are standing, I will have you continue to
340 stand because it is the practice of this Committee to put all
341 witnesses under oath.

342 [Witness sworn.]

343 Chairman WAXMAN. The record will indicate that you
344 answered in the affirmative.

345 We are delighted to have you here. We will put your
346 full statement in the record. If it is possible, we would
347 like to ask you to keep to around five minutes.

348 STATEMENT OF JANET WOODCOCK, M.D., DEPUTY COMMISSIONER FOR
349 OPERATIONS AND CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER, FOOD AND DRUG
350 ADMINISTRATION

351 STATEMENT OF JANET WOODCOCK

352 Dr. WOODCOCK. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of
353 the Committee, I am Janet Woodcock, Deputy Commissioner and
354 Chief Medical Officer of the Food and Drug Administration. I
355 thank you for the opportunity to testify about the scientific
356 and regulatory framework surrounding follow-on biologics.

357 In considering the complex scientific issues at hand, I
358 have relied not only on my experience leading the Center for
359 Drug Evaluation and Research for over a decade, but also on
360 my eight years of experience working in the Center for
361 Biologics Evaluation and Research, or CBER. While in CBER I
362 served as Acting Deputy Center Director and as Director of
363 the Office of Therapeutics, in which capacity I oversaw the
364 approval of biotechnology products to treat serious illnesses
365 such as cancer, multiple sclerosis, and cystic fibrosis.

366 The success of FDA's generic drugs program has spurred
367 interest in considering abbreviated application pathways for
368 more-complex molecules. Currently there are over 9,000
369 approved therapeutically equivalent generic drugs on the

370 market. They constitute about 60 percent of prescriptions
371 written in the United States. FDA's Office of Generic Drugs
372 currently approves generics at the rate of more than one per
373 calendar day.

374 The success of the program has stimulated competition.
375 for the last decade, the rate of submission to the Office of
376 Generic Drugs has rapidly increased. Submissions doubled
377 between 2002 and 2006, to a current rate of about 793
378 applications per year.

379 The office has implemented numerous process
380 improvements, have improved increased efficiency of the
381 review process, and recently, as part of FDA's initiative on
382 pharmaceutical quality for the 21st century, OGD instituted
383 the question-based review. Eventually it is hoped this
384 change will decrease submission of manufacturing supplements
385 by about 80 percent, and thus free up more time of the
386 reviewers to deal with this increased submission rate.

387 While the generics program has been very successful for
388 small molecules, scientific challenges remain. We do not
389 have good bio-equivalents methods for inhaled or many topical
390 medications, and must require clinical trials to demonstrate
391 equivalence. This has inhibited consumer access to generic
392 versions of these types of products.

393 In addition, a number of drugs are made from complex
394 molecules. In these cases, it can be difficult to tell

395 | whether a proposed generic version is structurally identical
396 | to the innovator product.

397 | Recently, as part of its critical path initiative, FDA
398 | has been evaluating the science needed to address these
399 | issues for generic drugs and is planning to lay out the
400 | scientific research that is needed to improve the process, as
401 | we did a number of years ago for innovator medical products.

402 | The topic for discussion today is variously referred to
403 | as follow-on proteins, follow-on biologics, generic
404 | biologics, as well as other labels. Many of these terms are
405 | very imprecise and confusing, and I hope we can discuss
406 | terminology.

407 | Largely, these terms are intended to refer to
408 | biotechnology produced protein products. In the U.S., such
409 | products are regulated either as drugs under the Food, Drug,
410 | and Cosmetic Act, or as biologic products under the Public
411 | Health Service Act. Whether regulated as drugs or biologic
412 | products, proteins fit into the category of complex molecules
413 | that can be difficult to fully characterize.

414 | Copies of protection products that are regulated as
415 | drugs may be considered for the abbreviated applications
416 | pathways that exist under section 505. The very simplest
417 | peptide products may be able to demonstrate that they contain
418 | the same active ingredient as the innovator product, and thus
419 | may be considered under 505(j), what is commonly regarded as

420 the generic drug pathway.

421 In contrast, copies of approved protein products that
422 are drugs would currently be considered for abbreviated
423 applications under 505(b)(2), and the reason for this is that
424 scientific techniques are not available to demonstrate
425 sameness of these types of molecules.

426 The degree to which any abbreviated pathway could be
427 used for any given protein depends on many factors, including
428 its physical complexity, the availability of functional
429 assays to characterize it, and its clinical use.

430 An abbreviated pathway does not exist for copies of
431 protein products approved under the PHS Act. FDA has
432 approved several follow-on proteins under 505(b)(2),
433 including a recombinant hyaluronidase and recombinant version
434 of human growth hormone.

435 We are currently preparing a guidance document on the
436 general scientific framework for preparation of abbreviated
437 applications for follow-on proteins under 505(b)(2). We
438 expect to follow this with guidance on technical issues such
439 as immunogenicity, dealing with immunogenicity of proteins
440 and physical characterization methods.

441 I will be pleased to answer your questions regarding
442 these complex issues.

443 [Prepared statement of Dr. Woodcock follows:]

444 | ***** INSERT ***** |

445 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Woodcock.

446 As you mention in your testimony, for over ten years FDA
447 has allowed brand name manufacturers of biotech drugs to make
448 certain changes in the process by which they manufacture
449 their products, but without repeating all the original
450 clinical trials, under something called comparability
451 protocols. I am interested in understanding the scientific
452 rationale for allowing brand name manufacturers to make
453 process changes without new clinical trials. I am also
454 interested in its applicability to follow-on and biogeneric
455 products.

456 What was the scientific basis for FDA's conclusion that
457 clinical outcome trials are not necessary to assess the
458 effects of certain biological product changes?

459 Dr. WOODCOCK. Manufacturing changes and process changes
460 are undertaken for all pharmaceutical products, whether drugs
461 or biologics. In each case we have to determine whether or
462 not the change could result in any clinically significant
463 change in the product, whether it is a small molecule or
464 whether it is a large, complex molecule of some kind. FDA
465 has a long history of quality regulation, putting into place
466 procedures, both physical characterization of the new product
467 and comparing it to the old product, functional
468 characterization of a new product compared to the original
469 product, and sometimes clinical characterization of a new

470 product. It depends on, as I said in my oral testimony, how
471 much science we have available to assess these changes.

472 If we can be sure, based on a structural
473 characterization, which we often can for a drug, then that
474 would be sufficient for a small molecule drug. If that
475 structural characterization isn't enough to assure that the
476 new version is similar to the old version, then other types
477 of tests might be necessary. And in some cases we might even
478 require clinical tests.

479 For example, with small molecule drugs, when the
480 formulation is changed we may require new bioequivalent
481 studies.

482 Chairman WAXMAN. So that is completely within your
483 discretion based on whether you think it is appropriate to
484 have further evaluations, further studies?

485 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes. There are multiple scientific issues
486 that come into play in any given manufacturing change.

487 Chairman WAXMAN. I know most of these comparability
488 decisions involving biotech drugs or any other drugs are
489 confidential, but with the biotech drug Avonex the
490 information is public. I assume you are familiar with that
491 case?

492 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes.

493 Chairman WAXMAN. What kinds of process changes did FDA
494 permit in that case without repeating the original safety and

495 effectiveness trials?

496 Dr. WOODCOCK. In that case the original cell line that
497 had been used to manufacture the product that was used in the
498 clinical trials was no longer available, so the manufacturer
499 had to go back and redo all of that and duplicate the
500 manufacturing process that had been used for the original
501 product. That is well described publicly. They made some
502 original attempts. Those weren't successful.

503 They made some subsequent attempts and then extensive
504 amount of comparison was made between the original product
505 and the second version of the product, both the kinds I just
506 described, both physical/chemical comparisons, functional
507 comparisons, and so forth, so that at the end of the day it
508 was decided that the products were similar enough that FDA
509 could extrapolate from the clinical data that was derived for
510 the first product to the new product.

511 Chairman WAXMAN. Were the changes between the two
512 products significant?

513 Dr. WOODCOCK. The products were very similar, ended up
514 being very similar.

515 Chairman WAXMAN. I meant the process changes. Were they
516 significant?

517 Dr. WOODCOCK. The manufacturer attempted to duplicate
518 the similar process that was originally done with the first
519 product, but it was in a different site, in a different

520 scale, and so forth, so there were differences. It was not
521 the identical cell line. It wasn't the identical product
522 that had been made, and so forth.

523 Chairman WAXMAN. Are these changes similar to the kinds
524 of changes that might be required to manufacture a follow-on
525 product?

526 Dr. WOODCOCK. The difference between that example and
527 the instance where a new manufacturer would attempt to
528 manufacture a follow-on product would be that in the Avonex
529 case the manufacturer had access to all the information about
530 the process of manufacturing the first product. That is very
531 important information, because it has information on all the
532 intermediate steps and what happens during the manufacturing
533 and purification process, and so on.

534 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you.

535 Mr. Davis?

536 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. We will start with Mr. Issa.

537 Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Issa?

538 Mr. ISSA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
539 you, Ranking Member Davis.

540 Avonex appears to be an example sort of--I will use a
541 different wine than the one here, but you are talking at the
542 Rothschilds trying to duplicate after they have had to clear
543 their grapes away and put a new crop in. You have got the
544 same maker with the same wine masters--in this case

545 scientists--trying to duplicate what they had already made.
546 is that roughly correct? You may not be a California wine
547 drinker, so I know it can be challenging.

548 Dr. WOODCOCK. I love California wine.

549 Mr. ISSA. You won't love the one here in this box. Trust
550 me.

551 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes. As an analogy, that is quite
552 reasonable.

553 Mr. ISSA. Okay. So the next step that the Chairman's
554 legislation or the legislation we are hearing here today
555 would attempt to do is to say that, even though you had to
556 sort of teach or go through a process, a re-learning process,
557 even with the original designer, you are going to try and
558 transfer this to a different winery, and they are going to
559 try to get up, but they are not going to have the right to
560 every trade secret, if you will. Not every nuance of the
561 process is, in fact, in the public domain; is that correct?

562 Dr. WOODCOCK. That is correct. We face that now with
563 our generic drug program.

564 Mr. ISSA. Okay. And you mentioned earlier that you have
565 had chemical equivalents that didn't work out so well when
566 they went generic, so to speak, even among name
567 manufacturers. When an insurance company does a formulary
568 and says this is equal to this, that is not always right, is
569 it? There are side effects that are unanticipated often?

570 Dr. WOODCOCK. The generic drugs that we approve are
571 fully interchangeable with the innovator drugs. They are
572 therapeutically equivalent.

573 Mr. ISSA. You have never had a side effect?

574 Dr. WOODCOCK. We have numerous reports of side effects;
575 however, we investigate those and we have extraordinarily
576 rarely found any instance where there would be therapeutic
577 inequivalence between a generic drug and an innovator drug.

578 Mr. ISSA. Now, when we get to biological and follow-on
579 immune problems that occur, that is a different problem that
580 you are not presently seeing as much in small cells but you
581 do see it in biologics, don't you?

582 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes. Proteins are what is called
583 immunogenic. They produce often an immune response in people
584 when they are administered.

585 Mr. ISSA. So if two otherwise the same follow-ons, the
586 original and the follow-on, one could very much have a
587 different immune response that would lead somebody who had
588 successfully fought a disease to somehow develop a
589 resistance; is that correct?

590 Dr. WOODCOCK. The immune response to a protein can cause
591 many things. It can cause what you just said, which is
592 neutralizing the effect, the beneficial effect of the
593 protein.

594 Mr. ISSA. And then you could find yourself unable to

595 | deal with either drug. In other words, you could make that
596 | change and find yourself opted out of the cure or the
597 | treatment?

598 | Dr. WOODCOCK. That is true, and there are difficulties,
599 | for example, with insulin sometimes.

600 | Mr. ISSA. So, given that you have this history,
601 | wouldn't, in the case of follow-on biologics, at least until
602 | this problem can be quantified, wouldn't you have a bias, an
603 | almost exclusive bias toward clinical trials, even if we gave
604 | you the jurisdiction and the right to shortcut those, limit
605 | those, eliminate them? From a standpoint of unsettled
606 | science, wouldn't it be proper to have clinical trials to
607 | ensure that that is not happening when, in fact, it can take
608 | someone who is surviving and put them in a position where
609 | they can no longer survive?

610 | Dr. WOODCOCK. Currently--and, of course, I can only
611 | address the proteins that we are looking at under the 505,
612 | under the FD&C Act.

613 | Mr. ISSA. Right, and you admit those are, by definition,
614 | less likely to be unknowns than the ones we are going toward;
615 | is that right?

616 | Dr. WOODCOCK. No. That is where the terminology I think
617 | is very confusing. We have approved proteins under the Food,
618 | Drug and Cosmetic Act provisions under 505(b)(2), and in
619 | those cases, for those recombinant proteins we have looked at

620 the immunogenicity in people.

621 Mr. ISSA. Okay, but you have looked at them?

622 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes.

623 Mr. ISSA. So, again, my one final exit question here in
624 this short time: clinical trials are the only way to know
625 whether substantially similar, substantially identical
626 follow-on bio are, in fact, going to have differences in the
627 immune response, or whatever term is appropriate; is that
628 right?

629 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes. We have very limited understanding
630 of the basis of an immune response, and we are not able to
631 fully predict immunogenicity in humans right now from
632 non-clinical data.

633 Mr. ISSA. And this could be dangerous?

634 Dr. WOODCOCK. The immunogenicity must be evaluated.

635 Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

636 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Issa.

637 Mr. Yarmuth?

638 Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

639 Dr. Woodcock, some in the brand name industry argue that
640 any process for approving copies of biologics should follow
641 the European Union model. The EU's governing directive,
642 which is comparable to a statute, is extremely flexible and
643 gives regulators great discretion to set procedures and
644 standards and so forth.

645 The drug regulatory body there, the EMEA, has also
646 established very particular procedures and approval standards
647 to implement those directives. You are nodding, so you are
648 obviously familiar with that process or that model?

649 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes.

650 Mr. YARMUTH. And the biotech industry seems to like that
651 public process that is used there for establishing and
652 setting guidelines that contain the data requirements for
653 biosimilars because the public gathering process allows those
654 companies to help dictate what data their competitors must
655 produce, and, of course, that would take a lengthy period of
656 time.

657 Is the FDA required to undertake a public process for
658 establishing data requirements?

659 Dr. WOODCOCK. No. We are not required to.

660 Mr. YARMUTH. Do you think it is scientifically necessary
661 for FDA to engage in public guideline process to establish
662 the data requirements for a follow-on protein product,
663 scientifically necessary?

664 Dr. WOODCOCK. What FDA does currently is engage with the
665 manufacturer in discussions--of course, those are not
666 public--to provide advice on any manufacturer interested in
667 pursuing a follow-on under 505(b)(2) process. But we often
668 write scientific guidance for manufacturers because it
669 provides better predictability and it provides, as you said,

670 transparency.

671 We are in the process of writing overall guidance on the
672 process of scientific approach to follow-on proteins under
673 505(b)(2).

674 Mr. YARMUTH. Do you think that this process that the
675 European Union uses, if we adopted that system here, would
676 have the effect of freezing science at all? Is that a risk
677 in doing that?

678 Dr. WOODCOCK. I am really not able to comment on that.

679 Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

680 Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman has a couple minutes,
681 would you yield your time to me?

682 Mr. YARMUTH. I would be happy to yield my time to the
683 distinguished chairman.

684 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you.

685 I just wanted to point out that the questioning by my
686 colleague, Mr. Issa, about how you might need to have
687 clinical trials to understand possible concerns, that is
688 legitimate. FDA does now at the present time allow some
689 changes in process without requiring clinical trials, but I
690 do want to point out that the legislation that I have
691 introduced would allow FDA to decide, when they think
692 clinical trials are appropriate, to require clinical trials.

693 I do want to ask you this. In the use of comparability
694 protocols limited to simple proteins, or can the manufactures

695 of more complex proteins make changes in their products
696 without repeating the original clinical trials?

697 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes, they can, if the science is there. It
698 is very desirable for manufacturers of pharmaceuticals of any
699 kind to make continuous improvements in their manufacturing
700 process to maintain the quality of the pharmaceuticals as
701 soon as possible and the efficiency of the process as good as
702 scientifically possible. So FDA has adopted procedures, as I
703 said, that allow manufacturers to make changes to their
704 manufacturing process or perhaps open up new plants, say, if
705 there is a demand for the product, and the amount of data
706 that has to be generated really depends on the complexity of
707 the product, how well we can physically characterize the
708 product, how confident we are that that physical
709 characterization will extrapolate to the same performance,
710 but we may require many additional steps, up to and including
711 clinical studies now, particularly of immunogenicity.

712 Chairman WAXMAN. Well, do you and other FDA scientists
713 feel confident that comparability assessments provide
714 adequate protection to patients from unsafe or ineffective
715 biotech drugs?

716 Dr. WOODCOCK. The comparability assessment puts the
717 burden on the manufacturer. The manufacturer must show to
718 FDA's satisfaction that the change has not introduced
719 anything that would be detrimental to the clinical

720 performance of the drug. So how much evidence is needed
721 after a manufacturing change depends on how well the
722 manufacturer can demonstrate that that product is going to
723 perform the exact same way as the original product did in the
724 clinical testing.

725 Chairman WAXMAN. And as science evolves, you will know
726 better whether the comparability requires clinical tests or
727 not; is that correct?

728 Dr. WOODCOCK. The ability to physically characterize
729 protein molecules and other complex substances has evolved
730 and is continuing to evolve, and so over time we are going to
731 be able to do a better and better job of controlling the
732 quality of these products and allowing for continuous
733 improvement.

734 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much.

735 Mr. Davis?

736 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I finally have my comparison up
737 there. We talked before about how complex these are. This
738 diagram up there, as you see, compares a biologic used to
739 treat anemia and a traditional drug that treats peptic ulcer.
740 It demonstrates the difference between the traditional
741 chemical drugs and biological therapies.

742 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes.

743 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. As you can note on this, the
744 biologic is significantly more complex than a traditional

745 drug.

746 Dr. Woodcock, you highlight in your testimony the
747 importance of ensuring that facilitating the development of
748 follow-on products through abbreviated pathways doesn't
749 discourage innovation and the development of new biological
750 products, and you refer to Hatch-Waxman as a balanced
751 approach. Do you think an extended period of data
752 exclusivity as well as certain patent protections like
753 Hatch-Waxman has would help encourage innovation and
754 development with biological products?

755 Dr. WOODCOCK. Sir, I am a doctor and a scientist, and
756 that is really outside of my area of expertise.

757 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Okay, so you don't want to make
758 the economic or policy determinations on that?

759 Dr. WOODCOCK. No.

760 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Okay. You also state in your
761 testimony that demonstrating the similarity of a follow-on
762 protein product to a reference product is more complex and
763 would require new data. Does this mean FDA would require
764 clinical safety data for follow-on biologics?

765 Dr. WOODCOCK. There is a very large range of complexity.
766 All right? The erythropoietin molecule that you have here
767 is a pretty complex example. There are very, very small
768 biologic drugs of different kinds. So the amount of
769 assurance and the amount of data that would be needed is

770 really based on how complex something is and how well it can
771 be characterized in different ways.

772 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. But a slight alteration could
773 have, you know, significant clinical manifestations, wouldn't
774 it?

775 Dr. WOODCOCK. FDA would not approve a follow-on product
776 or a generic drug that we were not confident would have the
777 same performance as the innovator drug.

778 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. What level of clinical safety
779 data would be necessary for approval, ball park?

780 Dr. WOODCOCK. Well, to talk about this we have to get
781 into terminology a little bit. Please bear with me.

782 The abbreviated application process for 505(b)(2), for
783 example, may rely on some fact of the approval of a prior
784 product. All right?

785 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Yes.

786 Dr. WOODCOCK. But we may approve a product using an
787 abbreviated application where some of the data, maybe some of
788 the clinical trials or animal studies do not have to be
789 repeated. However, that resulting of proof product is not
790 considered substitutable for the other product. In other
791 words, each of them stand alone and they can't be switched at
792 the pharmacy, or it is not recommended they would be. That
793 is one level.

794 Another level would be for a manufacturer to seek

795 interchangeability, full interchangeability. So far the
796 proteins that we have approved all stand on their own. They
797 have had abbreviated applications but they are not considered
798 interchangeable with any of the other proteins in that class.
799 For example, human growth hormone or hyaluronidase.

800 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. You testified that the science
801 and technology isn't sufficiently advanced to allow for
802 comparison of complex protein products. How close are we to
803 discovering those technology methods? Five years? Ten
804 years?

805 Dr. WOODCOCK. It is going to be a continuum, and right
806 now we are very short peptides, which are as small as the
807 ranidine molecule you are showing there, for example, or in
808 the same ball park. We can do it now, but those are very,
809 very small compared to the erythropoietin molecule, so it is
810 going to be a step-wise progression over a decade or so.

811 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Are there any non-clinical tests
812 or technology that could fully substitute for studying the
813 safety of biotech products in humans?

814 Dr. WOODCOCK. As I said, right now we do not have the
815 science around the immune system to adequately predict the
816 human immune response fully to any given product.

817 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. You listed two examples,
818 omnitrope and--I can't pronounce the other one.
819 Hyaluronidase?

820 Dr. WOODCOCK. That is pretty good.

821 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Neither was rated by FDA as
822 therapeutically equivalent or substitutes for other biologics
823 on the market. Many believe interchangeability or
824 substitution is where the most cost savings would occur. Of
825 course, the balance here is safety versus efficiency and
826 speed to market.

827 When do you think the FDA will be able to rate a
828 biologic product as interchangeable? And do you think the
829 FDA needs this authority if the science isn't developed yet?

830 Dr. WOODCOCK. For the 505(b)(2) drugs, which is what I
831 can comment on, manufacturers would need to do additional
832 clinical studies that would demonstrate interchangeability,
833 and that is a further step. That is a higher bar than simply
834 getting on the market, an abbreviated application. Does that
835 make sense to you?

836 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Davis.

837 Mr. Welch?

838 Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

839 Some of the drug companies have said that when a biotech
840 product is derived from a specific cell line, any copy of the
841 product will have to begin with a different cell line. They
842 are arguing, as I understand it, that this change is so
843 significant that all the clinical trials, all the clinical
844 trials must be repeated to ensure that the change has not

845 altered safety and effectiveness. Obviously, we are
846 concerned about safety, but we also want to get the benefit
847 and not have this argument about safety be used to deny us
848 the benefit.

849 My question to you is: is it true that a change in a
850 cell line will always necessitate repeating the original
851 clinical trials?

852 Dr. WOODCOCK. No. We do not believe that. Again, any
853 manufacturing change, whether the cell line, the DNA
854 construct, the manufacturing process, the way the drug is
855 purified, any of these could affect safety and effectiveness,
856 and therefore data has to be submitted and a very careful
857 look has to be taken to make sure that it hasn't. The amount
858 of data that we would need or that anyone would need to make
859 that evaluation depends, again, on the complexity of the
860 product.

861 Mr. WELCH. All right. So the bottom line here is that
862 you believe that you do not need, for safety, to repeat the
863 entire clinical trial?

864 Dr. WOODCOCK. In some instances the manufacturer may not
865 be able to show enough similarity and they may have to repeat
866 much of the clinical program. In other instances they may be
867 able to show an extreme amount of similarity, a very great
868 similarity to prior product, and therefore would have very
869 much smaller clinical trials needed, perhaps of

870 immunogenicity.

871 Mr. WELCH. And that is an evaluation that you would feel
872 confident, based on the information that you had at hand,
873 that you could make?

874 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes. FDA has a long history, as I said,
875 of controlling the access to market after manufacturing
876 changes for a very wide number of products for all
877 pharmaceuticals on the market, and this is another example of
878 that.

879 Mr. WELCH. I was going to ask another question, but you
880 are starting to answer it. What scientific developments have
881 allowed FDA to feel that confidence you are describing, that
882 manufacturers of existing biologics can change cell lines,
883 manufacturing facilities, and/or the fermentation processes
884 without having it conduct those clinical trials?

885 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes. And, as I said, sometimes they do
886 and sometimes they don't. It really depends. The burden is
887 on them, the manufacturer, to show through scientific data
888 that the performance of the product after the change process
889 is going to be the same as the performance of the product
890 before the change.

891 Mr. WELCH. And are clinical trials always the most
892 sensitive studies for detecting changes in safety or
893 effectiveness due to process changes?

894 Dr. WOODCOCK. No. No, I think that is a common

895 misconception. Clinical trials may be insensitive to certain
896 types of changes, adverse effects, for example, that are rare
897 or uncommon.

898 Mr. WELCH. Yes.

899 Dr. WOODCOCK. And we really need to use the scientific
900 tool to assess the change in the product that is appropriate.
901 It might be physical characterization or it might be a
902 functional test. It might be evaluation of the purity of the
903 product.

904 Mr. WELCH. Thank you. I yield the balance of my time.

905 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you for yielding. You have
906 another minute left on your time, so if the gentleman would
907 permit I will take that minute if he will yield to me.

908 Dr. Woodcock, if FDA were given broad authority to
909 require any studies necessary for approval of follow-on
910 versions of PHS Act approved protein products, are you
911 comfortable that the Agency could use its discretion to
912 ensure that only safe and effective products were made
913 available to patients? I think you have answered that
914 question several times, but let me just put it very clearly.

915 Dr. WOODCOCK. I think that FDA must do that. All right?
916 We do not currently approve generic products unless they
917 have absolutely met our standards and were follow-on products
918 under 505(b)(2). We must maintain the confidence in our
919 program and also our own scientific integrity.

920 Chairman WAXMAN. Based on your experience with the
921 comparability guidance, can you give the Committee a
922 perspective on how often companies must do clinical outcome
923 trials, not just PK or PD studies, to support a product or
924 process change after approval of its BLA? Are large clinical
925 outcome studies scientifically essential to support the
926 approval one out of ten post-approval product changes, one
927 out of twenty post-approval changes, or one out of fifty
928 changes?

929 Dr. WOODCOCK. I would say that the factor that is most
930 important here is the magnitude of the change; however, it is
931 probably more in the one in fifty range than the one in ten,
932 or whatever. But don't forget there are many different types
933 of changes that occur all the time to manufacturing
934 processes. If you included all of those, then requiring
935 clinical studies of outcomes would probably be quite rare.

936 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you.

937 Mr. Bilbray?

938 Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield my time
939 to the gentleman from the Northwest Territory, but I would
940 first like to clarify that, as a native Californian as
941 opposed to Mr. Issa who is an immigrant, I was outraged at
942 the concept of bringing a bottle of merlot to this table and
943 having it chilled.

944 [Laughter.]

945 Mr. BILBRAY. The only thing worse than that is to take
946 it from the table and take it back to his office after he
947 presented it.

948 But at this time I would like to yield to Mr. Burton.

949 Mr. BURTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I am
950 from the midwest, not the northwest.

951 Mr. BILBRAY. Well, the Northwest Territory.

952 Mr. BURTON. Ohio, the Northwest Territory. You are
953 going back a long way.

954 First of all, let me preface my remarks by saying the
955 pharmaceutical industry and FDA working together has created
956 probably the highest quality of life in the history of
957 mankind, and I appreciate that and I think everybody in
958 America does. There are some questions, though, that I have
959 to ask about the process.

960 You said it is a judgment call on whether or not this
961 product comes to market. Who makes the judgment? Who makes
962 the call?

963 Dr. WOODCOCK. The FDA.

964 Mr. BURTON. Don't they have advisory committees that
965 review the process, review the product, review the results,
966 and then they make a recommendation to the FDA?

967 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes. Advisory committees are frequently
968 utilized, particularly on clinical decisions. Here we are
969 talking about scientific characterization of the product in a

970 wide variety of ways. Most often, that is something that the
971 FDA scientists do.

972 Mr. BURTON. But the FDA does have advisory committees
973 for almost all of the products?

974 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes.

975 Mr. BURTON. When I was chairman I asked--I don't believe
976 it was you, but I asked one of your coworkers who was a
977 leader at the FDA how many times has an advisory committee
978 recommendation been turned down by the FDA.

979 Dr. WOODCOCK. You are asking me?

980 Mr. BURTON. Yes.

981 Dr. WOODCOCK. I don't know the answer to that.

982 Mr. BURTON. I will tell you what it was before. It was
983 never. The advisory committee, I was told by the people who
984 were doing the investigation for my Committee when I was
985 chairman, was that the advisory committee recommendations
986 were always accepted.

987 Now, the other thing I would like to know is: the
988 people on the advisory committee, do they file financial
989 disclosure reports?

990 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes, they do.

991 Mr. BURTON. We looked at some of the financial
992 disclosure reports when I was holding hearings on this when I
993 was chairman and we found that many of the people in the
994 advisory committees did not file financial disclosure

995 reports. And we found that some on the advisory committees
996 had a conflict of interest. The RotoShield virus was one of
997 those. The head of the advisory committee had an interest in
998 a company that was going to make a RotoShield virus vaccine,
999 which was put on the market at his advisory committee's
1000 recommendation, and FDA approved it based upon the
1001 recommendation. One or two children died and several people
1002 were injured and they pulled it off the market within 12
1003 months.

1004 I bring this up because this is a very important issue
1005 we are talking about today, and I would just like to ask that
1006 these advisory committees, when they make recommendation,
1007 that there is a thorough judgment made after the advisory
1008 committee makes its determination, and that the FDA does not
1009 always accept their results or their recommendations, and
1010 that there are complete financial disclosure reports.

1011 The reason for that is pretty obvious. If a person is
1012 on an advisory committee and their recommendation is accepted
1013 and they have a financial interest in a pharmaceutical
1014 company that is going to manufacture a product like that or a
1015 like product, they are liable to have their judgment tainted
1016 just a little bit. It has happened in the past and I hope it
1017 doesn't happen in the future.

1018 The cost of biotech drugs increased 17 percent from 2005
1019 to 2006, and that was compared to 5.4 percent increase for

1020 traditional pharmaceuticals, which are much more expensive
1021 here than in some other countries, in most cases. Why was
1022 that increase so much? Do you know?

1023 Dr. WOODCOCK. My understanding is that some of the new
1024 biotech products on the market that are very highly
1025 effective, you know, are very expensive to purchase, as some
1026 of the Members already alluded to. But I don't have any
1027 complete analysis of this.

1028 Mr. BURTON. I have a couple more questions, but I will
1029 wait.

1030 Chairman WAXMAN. We will have another round.

1031 Mr. BURTON. I will catch it next time.

1032 Dr. WOODCOCK. May I?

1033 Chairman WAXMAN. Yes.

1034 Dr. WOODCOCK. The FDA has recently published new
1035 guidance on advisory committee conflict of interest, and it
1036 lays out very explicit and transparent guidance on how people
1037 will be evaluated for their conflicts of interest.

1038 Mr. BURTON. That is very good news. I appreciate
1039 hearing that. That is a great step in the right direction.
1040 Thank you.

1041 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Burton.

1042 Mr. Davis?

1043 Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Thank you very much, Mr.
1044 Chairman.

1045 Dr. Woodcock, I have always tried to understand--and if
1046 you could enlighten me it would be very helpful to me--the
1047 real difference between generic drugs and the name brand. If
1048 they do essentially the same thing or if the level of
1049 effectiveness is essentially the same, why do we pay so much
1050 more for one as opposed to the other? I have never been able
1051 to, in my own mind, feel that I had a real understanding of
1052 that.

1053 Dr. WOODCOCK. Well, if I may, if you look at the
1054 diagram--it is gone now, but there was a diagram of the
1055 molecule up there, a small molecule. We know exactly
1056 everything how that molecule is structured. We know
1057 everything about it. And so what we do in the generic drug
1058 program is we require an exact copy of that molecule to be
1059 the generic drug and then we make sure that that molecule
1060 gets into the body the exact same way that the innovator
1061 molecule gets into the body. So then we say if it does that
1062 it is going to have the same effect on the body because it is
1063 circulating around in the body the same way as the innovator
1064 drug. So that is what a generic drug is.

1065 The problem with the proteins is it is very difficult to
1066 say we have the exact same molecule because it is such a
1067 complicated molecule.

1068 Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. The effectiveness or the impact,
1069 are we saying that we would expect a different level of

1070 impact or effectiveness using one as opposed to the other?

1071 Dr. WOODCOCK. For the generic drugs that FDA approves we
1072 expect the exact same performance. Now, that means the exact
1073 same good effects and the exact same side effects as the drug
1074 it is a copy of.

1075 Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Do you know then how the price or
1076 cost differential emerges or is determined?

1077 Dr. WOODCOCK. Well, while the innovator drug is patent
1078 protected or protected by exclusivity, there is no other
1079 copies available to be prescribed. During that time the
1080 price is quite high. Once generic versions get on the
1081 market, the price of the various generic copies becomes only
1082 a fraction of what was charged by the innovator.

1083 Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Are you aware or familiar with
1084 any consumer studies that would indicate whether or not
1085 consumers have a greater level of confidence, for example, in
1086 the more popular pharmaceuticals than the generics?

1087 Dr. WOODCOCK. Certainly the generics are not advertised
1088 and certainly there is some brand name loyalty that I have
1089 heard of. I have certainly talked to many, many consumers
1090 over my lifetime about this issue. There is some residual
1091 concern still about the generics and are they as good because
1092 they are not the brand name product; however, I think in the
1093 last 10 or 12 years of our generic drug program, confidence,
1094 both by the health professionals--the pharmacists, the

1095 doctors--as well as the consumers has really risen, and most
1096 people in this country are used to taking generic versions.

1097 Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. And so then one could probably
1098 reasonably assume that marketing plays a great role in
1099 shaping our attitudes and thoughts about the drugs that we
1100 would most likely prefer using?

1101 Dr. WOODCOCK. I can't comment on that directly, but that
1102 is one of the purposes of advertising.

1103 Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. And so I would assume that it
1104 probably works fairly well and that it does, in fact, skew
1105 one's thinking. And if we are talking about having the most
1106 cost-effective health care, then it just seems to me that the
1107 more enlightened consumers become, that will probably have as
1108 much impact on cost effectiveness in health care as anything
1109 that we are going to regulate or anything that we are going
1110 to do.

1111 I thank you very much for your answers.

1112 Dr. WOODCOCK. At the request of Congress, we had an
1113 education program, outreach program, on the generic drug
1114 program. It has been very effective.

1115 Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Thank you. Thank you very much.
1116 And thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

1117 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Davis.

1118 Mr. Burton was using Mr. Bilbray's time, and he said he
1119 had a few more questions, so before we go to a second round I

1120 yield to you your first-round five minutes.

1121 Mr. BURTON. Thank you. I just have a few more
1122 questions.

1123 Dr. Woodcock, I think you have been very helpful, some
1124 of your answers today. I really appreciate that.

1125 The pharmaceutical industry deserves to get some of
1126 their money back or all of their money back when they spend a
1127 lot of money on research and development, and that is why the
1128 patents are there, and then when it expires, of course, it
1129 can be a generic drug and they should have recovered their
1130 investment.

1131 Are other countries working to develop these biotech
1132 drugs?

1133 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes. As was alluded to earlier, the
1134 European Union has published a directive and is implementing
1135 a program on what they call biosimilars. By that generally
1136 they mean biotech drugs.

1137 Mr. BURTON. If they produce a biotech drug and there is
1138 a similar biotech drug that has been produced here in the
1139 United States, because of the differences, the scientific
1140 differences that you were talking about when we saw the slide
1141 a while ago, the FDA probably would not allow that drug to be
1142 imported into the United States until it was approved by the
1143 FDA, even though it did the same thing or pretty much the
1144 same thing?

1145 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes. The law doesn't allow drugs to be
1146 imported in the United States unless they are approved.

1147 Mr. BURTON. Let me ask you this one more question. If
1148 we had reimportation or importation of the pharmaceuticals
1149 that are approved by the FDA, would the prices of those
1150 pharmaceuticals be lower?

1151 Dr. WOODCOCK. Again, this is beyond my area of
1152 expertise. I apologize.

1153 Mr. BURTON. I will just follow up by saying that
1154 everybody wants free enterprise to succeed and they want the
1155 pharmaceutical industry to make a lot of money so that they
1156 can do continued research, but when my first wife had
1157 cancer--and I have talked about this before--we went to have
1158 her chemotherapy and the tamoxifen that one woman was taking,
1159 she was complaining about the cost being about \$300 a month,
1160 and another lady said I'm getting the same thing from Canada
1161 for \$50 a month, so it was six times less.

1162 There are a number of us in Congress that would like to
1163 see the FDA working with their counterparts in other
1164 countries and the pharmaceutical companies working with their
1165 counterparts in other countries and the governments of other
1166 countries to find out some way to level the playing field so
1167 that Americans are paying a comparable price for their
1168 pharmaceutical products as they do in other countries. It
1169 just doesn't seem fair to go to Germany or France or Spain or

1170 Canada and find that the very same product is being sold for
1171 much less and Americans are paying actually a great deal more
1172 for the research and development and the advertising than is
1173 being done elsewhere.

1174 That is just a suggestion. I appreciate very much your
1175 candid answers.

1176 I yield to the chairman.

1177 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much for yielding. The
1178 gentleman has a minute and a half, so I will be glad to take
1179 it.

1180 If a statute were passed giving FDA broad authority to
1181 review abbreviated applications for follow-on proteins, and
1182 if companies were ready to begin submitting applications as
1183 soon as the statute became law, is it reasonable to assume
1184 that FDA would be able to begin reviewing those applications
1185 as soon as they were submitted, assuming, for purpose of this
1186 question, that the statute did not require FDA to issue
1187 regulations or guidance as a prerequisite to review of
1188 applications?

1189 Dr. WOODCOCK. FDA is currently, as I said, reviewing
1190 applications and also inquiries from companies and so forth,
1191 providing guidance for drugs under the 505(b)(2) regimen. So
1192 we have the technical expertise to perform these functions.

1193 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you.

1194 Mr. Hodes?

1195 Mr. HODES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1196 Dr. Woodcock, I want to focus for a moment on the issue
1197 of comparability.

1198 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes.

1199 Mr. HODES. It is my understanding that biologics as a
1200 group are so diverse and in some cases so incompletely
1201 understood that there is today no one-size-fits-all set of
1202 studies that can demonstrate comparability. Is that true?

1203 Dr. WOODCOCK. Absolutely. Biologics, as opposed to
1204 biotech proteins, biologics range from everything from gene
1205 therapy to cells, living cells of different types, to
1206 tissues--a huge range of different kind of products.

1207 Mr. HODES. And am I correct that biopharmaceutical
1208 products often undergo changes after approval and that
1209 pre-change and post-change products will be comparable, as
1210 opposed to identical?

1211 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes. As we were discussing before,
1212 manufacturers need to continue to improve their process or
1213 they may need to open up new plants or increase the level of
1214 production, the scale of production. There are a lot of
1215 changes that have to be made. After each one of those
1216 changes, we must assess whether or not the performance of the
1217 product has changed.

1218 Mr. HODES. And the FDA establishes boundaries and
1219 batches. Different batches have to fall within established

1220 | boundaries for that product?

1221 | Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes. Any product, whether it is a small
1222 | molecule or drug, has slight variations lot to lot in any
1223 | kind of testing parameter that you would put on it, so the
1224 | traditional approach is you establish boundaries within which
1225 | a product can vary, but it can't go outside of those limits.

1226 | Mr. HODES. Now, just as the science is evolving on the
1227 | manufacturing side, certainly from the FDA's standpoint
1228 | techniques for assessing the structure and activity of
1229 | biologics are evolving rapidly, and our understanding of
1230 | biological structure and activity is improving all the time;
1231 | is that correct?

1232 | Dr. WOODCOCK. That is correct.

1233 | Mr. HODES. If Congress were to tell the FDA what
1234 | specific types of clinical data must always be required for
1235 | approval of follow-on biologics based on today's science,
1236 | could such clinical data requirements become obsolete?

1237 | Dr. WOODCOCK. Certainly, from my point of view,
1238 | flexibility in enabling us to incorporate the new science
1239 | into the regulatory process as that science evolves and
1240 | becomes available is in the best interest of the public as
1241 | well as the Agency and the industry.

1242 | Mr. HODES. And if a follow-on statute required a
1243 | clinical trial in every case, could it end up requiring
1244 | perhaps unnecessary and therefore potentially unethical

1245 trials in the future?

1246 Dr. WOODCOCK. Where trials aren't needed it is, you
1247 know, of questionable ethics to repeat them. So use of human
1248 subjects for trials that are not needed or simply to check a
1249 box on a regulatory requirement are not desirable.

1250 Mr. HODES. Let me ask you a question about the EU
1251 system. The EU regulations, as I understand
1252 them--imperfectly, I might add--require post-market
1253 surveillance; is that correct?

1254 Dr. WOODCOCK. I can't speak exactly. The Europeans have
1255 the ability to require post-marketing surveillance for any
1256 approved pharmaceutical.

1257 Mr. HODES. Does the FDA currently have any requirements
1258 for post-market surveillance?

1259 Dr. WOODCOCK. We very frequently request post-marketing
1260 studies be performed at the time of approval, and those are
1261 agreed to by the firms.

1262 Mr. HODES. So it is the manufacturers who are conducting
1263 the post-market surveillance?

1264 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes.

1265 Mr. HODES. But from the FDA, the FDA relies on the
1266 manufacturers for that post-market surveillance; the FDA
1267 doesn't do any of its own?

1268 Dr. WOODCOCK. Right. The FDA conducts the adverse event
1269 reporting system, which is an adverse event reports from

1270 doctors and companies, and we do some limited studies, but in
1271 general we do not have the capacity to do post-marketing
1272 surveillance as you are describing.

1273 Mr. HODES. Do you believe that with biogenerics
1274 developing as rapidly as the field is developing, that there
1275 should be expanded requirements for post-market surveillance?

1276 Dr. WOODCOCK. All pharmaceuticals when they are approved
1277 for the first time have a fair amount of uncertainty still
1278 surrounding them about their performance, and particularly,
1279 as we have discussed already, any protein product that would
1280 be approved would continue to have questions about
1281 immunogenicity and perhaps other side effects that would
1282 probably need to continue to be looked at in the
1283 post-marketing period.

1284 Mr. HODES. Can the FDA require post-marketing studies?

1285 Dr. WOODCOCK. What we do is say to the company, You need
1286 to agree to conduct this study, and if you do then that is
1287 part of the approval is that the company agrees to do that.

1288 Mr. HODES. So, if I understand your answer, the answer
1289 is yes, the FDA does have the authority to require
1290 post-market studies?

1291 Dr. WOODCOCK. At the time of approval.

1292 Mr. HODES. And what proportion of those post-market
1293 studies of those that you require are completed?

1294 Dr. WOODCOCK. That is a complicated question. There are

1295 many different types of studies that are requested, and some
1296 of them go on a long time, so there isn't a really high
1297 proportion. I don't know the exact number, because it
1298 depends on what analysis you are doing, but many of these
1299 studies are not completed.

1300 Mr. HODES. And if you were the last word on this,
1301 thinking about where the science is going with biogenerics,
1302 do you see a need for increased requirements for post-market
1303 studies of these biogenerics, none of which will ever be
1304 identical, either in batch or in actual structure, to the
1305 original?

1306 Dr. WOODCOCK. I believe it would be likely in many
1307 cases, but, as I said, this is going to be a case-by-case
1308 because of all the differences in the different products. In
1309 many cases FDA would need to have post-marketing surveillance
1310 or post-marketing studies done to resolve remaining
1311 uncertainties.

1312 Mr. HODES. And, last question, does the FDA have an
1313 enforcement mechanism to require completion of any
1314 post-marketing studies that you have required of the
1315 manufacturers?

1316 Dr. WOODCOCK. Our mechanism, we can publicize the fact
1317 that the studies have not been done, and we could take the
1318 drug off the market.

1319 Mr. HODES. So the enforcement mechanism is the possible

1320 removal of the drug from the market for lack of completion?

1321 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes.

1322 Mr. HODES. Has that ever been done?

1323 Dr. WOODCOCK. Not to my knowledge.

1324 Mr. HODES. Thank you.

1325 I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1326 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you. That is called the

1327 guillotine, except it is never used.

1328 Dr. Woodcock, I understand that it is quite a bit more

1329 complicated to establish interchangeability of two protein

1330 products than to establish their comparable safety and

1331 effectiveness. Would it be possible to demonstrate that a

1332 copy of a well-understood protein is interchangeable with the

1333 brand name drug if there are no limits on what studies can be

1334 required?

1335 Dr. WOODCOCK. We believe so. The situation in health

1336 care right now is that products that are interchangeable,

1337 they may be repeatedly switched back and forth. All right?

1338 And where you have a situation where you have a number of

1339 similar products on the market, the same indication, and they

1340 are very similar, it might be that they can be switched back

1341 and forth among one another multiple times for a given

1342 patient, depending on the plan and who they contract with and

1343 so on. In that situation either the innovator product could

1344 cause antibodies to the follow-on product or vice versa. We

1345 think we would have to test that in people to make sure, but
1346 we think it would be feasible to do those tests.

1347 Chairman WAXMAN. Is our understanding of protein
1348 structure and activity likely to evolve in a way that will
1349 make it possible to establish interchangeability in the
1350 foreseeable future, at least for some of these proteins, that
1351 may not be obvious at the present time?

1352 Dr. WOODCOCK. It may not be the protein, itself, that
1353 causes the immune response, but it could be different
1354 contaminants that are co-purified from the cell line or
1355 during the manufacturing process, or it can be changes that
1356 happen late in manufacturing or during storage or so forth,
1357 so it is really a very complicated situation.

1358 Chairman WAXMAN. For very simple, well-understood
1359 proteins, what kinds of studies might be required to
1360 establish interchangeability?

1361 Dr. WOODCOCK. Well, a study that actually performs that
1362 activity, which changes the patient back and forth from one
1363 version of the product to the next and follows the immune
1364 response.

1365 Chairman WAXMAN. Would that be a difficult study?

1366 Dr. WOODCOCK. No. In some cases there might be ethical
1367 issues that we would have to address very carefully. We
1368 would not want to set any patient up for harm.

1369 Chairman WAXMAN. Might the study requirements lessen

1370 over time as the molecules are better understood?

1371 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes.

1372 Chairman WAXMAN. Do you think that the FDA would ever
1373 declare a copy of a biotech drug regulated under Hatch-Waxman
1374 to be interchangeable if the Agency had doubts about whether
1375 it could be safely substituted for the brand name product?

1376 Dr. WOODCOCK. No. I mean, we believe that our finding
1377 of an A rating of interchangeability is our word. We are
1378 saying that scientifically we believe those products would be
1379 interchangeable, and we would not do that unless we believed
1380 that were the case and it was substantiated with scientific
1381 data.

1382 Chairman WAXMAN. Do you think that the FDA could be
1383 trusted to make appropriate interchangeability determinations
1384 for protein products if the Agency were given statutory
1385 authority to approve copies of biologics under the PHS Act?

1386 Dr. WOODCOCK. I believe that the FDA can be trusted to
1387 carry out its mandate from Congress, whatever that might be.

1388 Chairman WAXMAN. And if we gave you an additional
1389 mandate, you feel you would be able to live up to it?

1390 Dr. WOODCOCK. Yes. I believe we have scientific
1391 expertise. As we have already discussed, we have been
1392 managing manufacturing changes for all pharmaceuticals on the
1393 market for a very long time.

1394 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you.

1395 Let me see if any Member wishes additional time for
1396 questions?

1397 [No response.]

1398 Chairman WAXMAN. If not, let me thank you very much for
1399 your presentation and your willingness to answer these
1400 questions. I think it has been very helpful for us in our
1401 understanding of this issue. Thank you very much.

1402 Dr. WOODCOCK. Thank you.

1403 Chairman WAXMAN. The Chair would like to now call
1404 forward our second panel.

1405 Dr. Geoffrey Allan is the President, CEO, and Chairman
1406 of the Board of Insmmed Incorporated located in Richmond,
1407 Virginia. Insmmed is a biopharmaceutical company focused on
1408 the development and commercialization of drugs for the
1409 treatment of metabolic diseases and endocrine disorders with
1410 unmet medical needs.

1411 Dr. Theresa L. Gerrard is now the President of TLG
1412 Consulting, Inc., where she assists pharmaceutical and
1413 biotechnology companies in product development and regulatory
1414 strategy. Prior to that she spent 11 years as a Division
1415 Director in FDA's Center for Biologics Evaluation and
1416 Research, and she has also previously served as Director of
1417 Development for Amgen.

1418 Dr. Bill Schwieterman is a physician and scientist by
1419 training who now acts as an industry consultant to major

1420 biotech pharmaceutical companies on product clinical
1421 development issues. Dr. Schwieterman started his career at
1422 NIH and subsequently moved to FDA, where he worked for ten
1423 years and served as the Chief of Immunology and Infectious
1424 Disease Branch within FDA's Center for Biologics Evaluation
1425 and Research.

1426 Inger Mollerup has been the Vice President for
1427 Regulatory Affairs at Nova Nordisk A/S since 2004. Nova
1428 Nordisk is a pharmaceutical company which focuses on diabetes
1429 care, as well as hemostasis management, growth hormone
1430 therapy, and hormone replacement therapy.

1431 Dr. Ganesh Venkataraman is Co-Founder and Senior Vice
1432 President of Research at Momenta Pharmaceuticals. Momenta
1433 Pharmaceuticals, Inc., is a biotechnology company located in
1434 Cambridge, Massachusetts focused on the treatment of disease
1435 through an understanding of sugars and complex biomolecules.

1436 We are pleased to welcome all of you to our hearing
1437 today. We appreciate your being here.

1438 It is the custom of this Committee to put all witnesses
1439 under oath. You are not being singled out. I would like to
1440 ask you to please stand and raise your right hands.

1441 [Witnesses sworn.]

1442 Chairman WAXMAN. The record will reflect that each
1443 member answered in the affirmative.

1444 We will make your prepared statements part of the record

1445 | in its entirety. We would like to ask, if you would, to try
1446 | to limit the oral presentation to around five minutes.

1447 | Why don't we start with Dr. Allan, and then we will move
1448 | right down the line. You see we do have a timer. Dr. Allen?

1449 STATEMENTS OF GEOFFREY ALLEN, PH.D, PRESIDENT, CHIEF
1450 EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, INSMED
1451 INCORPORATED; THERESA LEE GERRARD, PH.D, PRESIDENT, TLG
1452 CONSULTING, INC. (BIOPHARMACEUTICAL CONSULTANTS) (FORMERLY
1453 WITH AMGEN AND FDA'S CENTER FOR BIOLOGICS); BILL
1454 SCHWIETERMAN, M.D., PRESIDENT, TEKGENICS CORPORATION
1455 (BIOPHARMACEUTICAL CONSULTANTS) (FORMERLY WITH FDA'S CENTER
1456 FOR BIOLOGICS); INGER MOLLERUP, VICE PRESIDENT FOR REGULATORY
1457 AFFAIRS, NOVA NORDISK A/S; AND GANESH VENKATARAMAN, PH.D,
1458 SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, RESEARCH, MOMENTA PHARMACEUTICALS,
1459 INC.

1460 STATEMENT OF GEOFFREY ALLAN

1461 Mr. ALLAN. Good morning, Chairman Waxman, Ranking Member
1462 Davis, and members of the Oversight and Government Reform
1463 Committee. I am delighted to have the opportunity to testify
1464 before your Committee. The focus of my discussion will be
1465 the role of small, innovative biotechnology companies in the
1466 current debate regarding the development of a regulatory
1467 pathway for approving biogeneric drugs.

1468 My name is Geoffrey Allan, and I currently serve as the
1469 Chief Executive Officer of Insmmed, Incorporated. Insmmed is a
1470 small biotechnology company focused on the development and

1471 commercialization of drugs for the treatment of metabolic and
1472 endocrine disorders where there are clear unmet medical
1473 needs.

1474 We received FDA approval for our lead product, IPLEX, at
1475 the end of 2005. IPLEX is a therapeutic protein which is
1476 approved for the treatment of children suffering from a rare
1477 growth disorder. We are currently continuing to develop
1478 IPLEX for several major medical illnesses such as myotonic
1479 muscular dystrophy and medical complications associated with
1480 HIV infection.

1481 I am here today to talk about biogeneric drug
1482 development and the regulatory path forward. I believe our
1483 experience with IPLEX is very illustrative of the scientific
1484 and technical issues confronting biogeneric drug developers,
1485 issues such as comparability testing and the nature and
1486 extent of clinical trials needed to support characterization
1487 of a generic biologic. Our experience tells us that these
1488 issues can be addressed using sound, readily available
1489 scientific approach.

1490 Insmmed has developed significant intellectual capital
1491 focused towards protein characterization and purification.
1492 We have invested in building a facility required to
1493 manufacture quality proteins. The biogenerics business is a
1494 business in which we would like to specialize. The
1495 combination of our proprietary protein platform with a

1496 biogeneric protein platform meets our goal to sustain
1497 innovation, along with the ability to provide safe and
1498 affordable drugs to address a growing economic issue.

1499 It is my belief that there are a number of my colleagues
1500 in similar-sized companies that are also interested in
1501 providing the scientific expertise to meet the challenges of
1502 producing biogenerics. I believe that I am representing the
1503 interests of many smaller biotechnology companies and large
1504 contract manufacturing companies. I believe H.R. 1038
1505 provides for a fair balance between reward and innovation in
1506 creating a timely approval pathway in commercialization of
1507 biogenerics in the marketplace; therefore, passing this bill
1508 would be a positive step for the biotech industry and
1509 continue to fuel the cycle of innovation.

1510 As the Chief Executive Officer of a small biotechnology
1511 company, I hope my testimony will provide a different
1512 perspective on this important issue and bring to light some
1513 of the important reasons why this bill is the correct model
1514 to create a robust, competitive, and innovation
1515 biopharmaceutical marketplace.

1516 IPLEX is a recombinant protein product. In fact, it is
1517 a combination of two different recombinant protein molecules.
1518 It is a relatively large molecule, larger than insulin,
1519 growth hormone, the interferons and Epogen, and certainly no
1520 less complex in its structural characteristics. As a new

1521 drug, along with the demonstration of safety and efficacy in
1522 the target population, structural characterization of the
1523 protein and the development of quality manufacturing process
1524 was our central focus during the development of the product.

1525 During the course of the development of this product, we
1526 modified the manufacturing process several times. We changed
1527 cell lines. We changed purification procedures. We changed
1528 raw material sources. And on more than one occasion we
1529 changed the facilities where this product was manufactured.
1530 At all times, good analytical methodology was the bedrock of
1531 our comparability testing to ensure that we produced a
1532 consistent, highly-purified protein.

1533 Analytical methodology to allow structural
1534 characterization of proteins has evolved enormously over the
1535 years. It is sophisticated and has exquisite sensitivity.
1536 For example, we use a battery of sensitive an analytical
1537 tests. More than ten of these tests are used, one of which
1538 is a technology called mass spectroscopy. This technique has
1539 such high resolution that on certain molecules we can detect
1540 changes as small as a single proton within the molecule.
1541 This is essentially not a crude science.

1542 During the development of IPLEX we worked closely with
1543 the FDA. They clearly used their discretion to decide what
1544 tests we needed to support our scientific approach as we made
1545 changes to our manufacturing processes. Their

1546 recommendations were rationale and certainly not onerous. On
1547 the occasion that we changed the site of manufacture of the
1548 drug, moving our process from a U.K. facility to our own
1549 facility in Colorado, we conducted a simple pharmacokinetic
1550 study in human volunteers to establish the equivalence of the
1551 products after the facility change. We established very
1552 quickly, within one month, that the amount of drug in the
1553 bloodstream was consistent, regardless of where the drug was
1554 manufactured.

1555 IPLEX was being developed for use in children, and as
1556 such both we and the FDA knew that safety at all times was
1557 paramount and was certainly never jeopardized. For example,
1558 FDA was concerned that immunogenicity of the product could
1559 vary as we changed the process. We established surveillance
1560 procedures to address this issue, and we continue to monitor
1561 for signs of immunogenicity today.

1562 I have only given you a very brief overview of the type
1563 of scientific and technical issues we had to address in the
1564 development of this product, IPLEX; however, these issues are
1565 at the heart of what a biogeneric manufacturer would have to
1566 confront. The science has reached a level of sophistication
1567 to make this endeavor entirely possible. All we need now is
1568 the regulatory go-ahead.

1569 The proposal introduced by Chairman Waxman is extremely
1570 appealing as a next step in stimulating competition in order

1571 | to address an ever-increasing economic problem facing our
1572 | health care system. Based on our company's experience with
1573 | the FDA during the approval process of IPLEX, I am confident
1574 | that this legislation is based on sound science and
1575 | progressive insight into where the market should be in the
1576 | coming years.

1577 | Once again, thank you for this unique and important
1578 | opportunity to share my experience and views. I look forward
1579 | to your questions.

1580 | [Prepared statement of Mr. Allan follows:]

1581 | ***** INSERT *****

1582 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Allan.
1583 Dr. Gerrard?

1584 STATEMENT OF THERESA GERRARD

1585 Ms. GERRARD. Good morning, Chairman Waxman, Ranking
1586 Member Davis, and members of the Committee. My name is
1587 Theresa Gerrard. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity
1588 to testify this morning on the importance of establishing a
1589 science-based, abbreviated approval pathway for biogenerics.

1590 From 1984 to 1995 I was with the FDA and was a Division
1591 Director with responsibility for IND and BLA review of
1592 hundreds of biotech products. I chaired licensing committees
1593 for Amgen's Neupogen, Genentech's Actimmune, and was involved
1594 in the review of beta Interferon from Chiron and Biogen.

1595 After leaving FDA, I was Director of Development for
1596 Amgen in Boulder, Colorado, where I had oversight of
1597 development of several biotech products. For the past nine
1598 years I worked as a consultant, where I have worked with many
1599 companies, primarily brand biotech companies.

1600 The purity of biotech products and the sophistication of
1601 analytical testing that exists today allowed the production
1602 of safe biotech drugs. Analytical testing consists of
1603 multiple sophisticated tests that are used to assess the

1604 physical, chemical, and biological characteristics of the
1605 product. Many more tests are used to assess a biologic than
1606 are typically used to assess a drug, because biotech products
1607 are more complex than drugs.

1608 These tests set the product specifications or goalposts,
1609 if you will, for every batch of biotech product that must
1610 fall between these goalposts. This is between no two batches
1611 of biotech products are identical. There are always minor
1612 variations.

1613 The advances in analytical characterization for
1614 well-characterized biologics allowed FDA to develop
1615 scientific police officers on comparability in the early
1616 1990s. This gave brand manufacturers the ability to change
1617 the manufacturing processes without the need for redoing the
1618 original clinical outcome trials if the product generated by
1619 the new process was shown to be comparable to product made by
1620 the old process.

1621 Now, when we speak of biologic, the focus is on
1622 comparability. Why? Because no two batches of biologic
1623 product, whether brand or generic, will ever be identical.
1624 Therefore, biologics are and should always be discussed in
1625 the context of comparability. Yes, small changes in
1626 manufacturing could have an impact on the final product, but
1627 we have known this for more than a decade and can detect
1628 these changes.

1629 For the past 15 years, FDA has gained substantial
1630 experience and expertise in assessing manufacturing changes
1631 and comparability data for a large number of protein
1632 products. The underlying scientific principles that guided
1633 comparability policy are still valid and can and should be
1634 adopted for generic biopharmaceuticals. Why? Because the
1635 types of post-approval brand product changes are reflective
1636 of the issues biotech and generic companies will face in
1637 bringing generic biotech products to the market.

1638 The primary premise of comparability is that analytical
1639 testing is the most sensitive method to detect differences
1640 between two products. Clinical trials are rather insensitive
1641 in detecting product differences because the variation among
1642 people and their response to a biopharmaceutical does not
1643 allow one to detect subtle product differences. Analytical
1644 testing, by itself, will not be sufficient in every case to
1645 demonstrate that a generic will have the same safety and
1646 efficacy as the brand biotech product. In those cases, FDA
1647 can require additional data such as animal studies, human
1648 pharmacokinetic studies, or even clinical trials. There is
1649 not a one-size-fits-all model, but FDA can determine the
1650 amount of data needed based on the complexity of the product,
1651 the history of the clinical use, and the extent of analytical
1652 characterization to determine its comparability with the
1653 brand.

1654 Before concluding, the question of immunogenicity has
1655 been raised in the discussion of both brand and generic
1656 biopharmaceuticals, and I would like to take a moment to just
1657 briefly touch on this topic.

1658 Immunogenicity means the body generates antibodies to a
1659 specific foreign substance, such as bacteria, and it is a
1660 normal response in keeping people healthy. People routinely
1661 make antibodies to many different substances and experience
1662 no negative effects. Some biologics can cause people to
1663 generate antibodies which are specific to that product, but
1664 most will not have any affect on safety or efficacy. For
1665 some to imply that immunogenicity reactions are always
1666 harmful is just plain incorrect.

1667 FDA can assess the risk for immunogenicity when it
1668 reviews the products for purity, safety, and overall quality
1669 and can request additional clinical data when necessary.
1670 While immunogenicity is an important consideration for
1671 biogenerics, it is certainly not a hurdle to their
1672 development.

1673 Mr. Chairman, the science exists for a creation of a
1674 clear, efficient, abbreviated biogeneric approval pathway.
1675 Analytical tests, combined with additional data when needed,
1676 would ensure the safety and efficacy of generic
1677 biopharmaceuticals.

1678 Thank you.

1679 [Prepared statement of Ms. Gerrard follows:]

1680 ***** INSERT *****

1681 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Gerrard.
1682 Dr. Schwieterman?

1683 STATEMENT OF WILLIAM SCHWIETERMAN

1684 Dr. SCHWIETERMAN. Good morning, Chairman Waxman and
1685 members of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

1686 My name is Dr. William Schwieterman. I thank you for
1687 the opportunity to appear before the Committee today and
1688 present the scientific and clinical perspective on the issue
1689 of biogenerics.

1690 One of the most disturbing experiences for a physician
1691 is to know that a treatment is available to help your
1692 patient, but the cost may simply be beyond what your patient
1693 can afford. For this reason, I deeply share your goal,
1694 Congressman Waxman, of creating a sound, scientifically based
1695 approval pathway for biogenerics. And, given that I also had
1696 the privilege of working at FDA in the area of biotechnology
1697 for ten years, I know that your goal can and should be
1698 achieved.

1699 I come before you today wearing three hats: as a
1700 physician, as a scientist, and as a former FDA reviewer.
1701 From this vantage point I would like to make the following
1702 critical points to the Committee:

1703 First, with today's scientific advancements and
1704 technologies, we can assure the safety and efficacy of
1705 biogenerics.

1706 Second, the supporting science for this is not new. It
1707 has existed for over a decade.

1708 Third, the issues raised in post-approval brand changes
1709 are reflective of the issues that are raised in the field of
1710 biogenerics. As such, the same science that determines
1711 comparability for the brand tech industry can also be adopted
1712 to ensure the safety and efficacy of complaint and
1713 interchangeable biogenerics.

1714 Having worked extensively with Agency physicians and
1715 scientists, it is clear to me that there is just one Agency
1716 safety standard, and that standard has been and will continue
1717 to be applied in the review and approval of each and every
1718 biologic, whether it be a brand or a generic.

1719 The standards and science used for current
1720 biopharmaceuticals are informative to us with respect to
1721 biogenerics. A critical but not often publicized fact in the
1722 biopharmaceutical industry is that FDA does not require brand
1723 companies to perform large clinical outcome studies to retest
1724 the product generated by new manufacturing processes. This
1725 is because such an approach would not only be infeasible,
1726 but, more importantly, would ignore the utility of existing
1727 sophisticated scientific analytic tools and techniques for

1728 | this purpose.

1729 | Let me briefly summarize what happens in these
1730 | instances. FDA starts with an assessment of extensive
1731 | analytical comparability data. With these data, and keeping
1732 | in mind the nature of the drug, the tests used, and the
1733 | disease being studied, FDA decides how to proceed. The
1734 | Agency can give a thumbs-up or a thumbs-down regarding each
1735 | post-approval brand manufacture change and, if thumbs-up,
1736 | have that change be supported by the analytic data, alone.
1737 | The analytic data, coupled with pharmacokinetic and/or
1738 | pharmacodynamic studies or the analytic data--the studies
1739 | just mentioned--plus data from a large clinical outcome
1740 | study.

1741 | As you already have heard, the vast majority of brand
1742 | manufacturing changes need no further studies when data from
1743 | analytic tests show the products to be comparable. For a
1744 | small number of brand products that show small differences in
1745 | these analytic tests following manufacturing changes, FDA may
1746 | require additional analytic tests and pharmacokinetic or
1747 | pharmacodynamic tests to be conducted in animals or humans.

1748 | These later studies, PKBPD studies, they are clinical
1749 | studies in the sense that they are conducted in patients in
1750 | the clinic, but they are not the large clinical outcome
1751 | studies commonly used to determine the product's ultimate
1752 | clinical effects.

1753 These pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic studies almost
1754 always involve fewer than 100 patients, and in general last
1755 weeks, not many months.

1756 Rarely after a brand manufacturing change does the FDA
1757 require that a brand company take the last step, repeating a
1758 full-scale clinical outcome study. Such studies are not
1759 usually necessary because the variability and noise involved
1760 in most clinical outcome studies make them inefficient for
1761 determining comparability between agents. In fact, of all
1762 the hundreds of brand biologic product changes, the vast
1763 majority were approved without large clinical outcome trials.

1764 In sum, FDA's scientists and physicians routinely make
1765 comparability determinations, since manufacturing changes
1766 occur throughout the brand biologic product development and
1767 life cycle. The comparability algorithm has existed for over
1768 a decade to allow brand biologic manufacturers to change and
1769 improve their manufacturing processes.

1770 In closing, I want to emphasize to the Committee again
1771 that the science of comparability is not a new ont, but
1772 rather an old one used by the Agency and the brand industry
1773 for more than a decade to determine comparability.

1774 Chairman Waxman, the Access to Life-Saving Medicines Act
1775 will give FDA the authority and the flexibility it needs to
1776 ensure the safety and efficacy of biogenerics. I comment you
1777 for adopting the same scientific principles, processes, and

1778 | procedures that exist for the brand biologic industry when
1779 | making post-approval manufacturing product changes to the
1780 | biogeneric sector.

1781 | Our mission as a physician reviewer at FDA and that of
1782 | all my colleagues then an drug now is to protect the public
1783 | by ensuring the safety of the supply of biopharmaceuticals.
1784 | No one's interests are served if safety is not viewed as
1785 | paramount.

1786 | Thank you very much.

1787 | [Prepared statement of Dr. Schwieterman follows:]

1788 | ***** INSERT *****

1789 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Schwieterman.
1790 Ms. Mollerup?

1791 STATEMENT OF INGER MOLLERUP

1792 Ms. MOLLERUP. Chairman Waxman, Ranking Member Davis,
1793 members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to
1794 testify today. My name is Inger Mollerup. I am Vice
1795 President for Regulatory Affairs of Nova Nordisk, a company
1796 with an 80-year history of producing insulin and other
1797 proteins.

1798 I am a scientist, not a lawyer, and as such have for the
1799 last 30 years been engaged in the design of manufacturing
1800 processes and development programs for numerous recombinant
1801 proteins. In 2005 I represented the in drug before the
1802 European Medicines Agency, the EMEA, discussing the insulin
1803 follow-on guidance, and I also presented to the World Health
1804 Organization's INN Committee on issues related to naming of
1805 all therapeutic proteins, including follow-ons.

1806 Nova Nordisk believes that any pathway for follow-on
1807 biologics must be, first and foremost, constructed to protect
1808 patient safety, be rooted in the best science, preserve
1809 innovation, and respect for proprietary information.

1810 Three major points from my testimony today are:

1811 firstly, that characterization does not tell the whole story;
1812 secondly, that pre-clinical and laboratory tests are not
1813 sufficient to determine immunogenicity and other important
1814 safety parameters; and, thirdly, that current science does
1815 not support interchangeability.

1816 Firstly, characterization does not tell the whole story.
1817 Any pathway must fully address the patient safety
1818 considerations of medicines that are similar to or comparable
1819 to instead of same as the reference product. Given that
1820 proposals currently before Congress go far beyond the science
1821 in an effort to deem products having minor differences in
1822 immuno-acid sequence as highly similar, I share with you an
1823 experience we had at Nova Nordisk as we were developing a
1824 fast-acting insulin analog wherein two potential candidates
1825 having one amino acid difference were tested.

1826 All candidates were put into an extensive chemical
1827 preclinical and clinical program. The candidate taken to
1828 market had only one change to the immuno acid sequence from
1829 human insulin, resulting in an analog with significantly
1830 shorter timing of action than human insulin and a unique
1831 safety profile.

1832 An earlier candidate, which had also one amino acid
1833 substitution, showed a positive effect on the timing of
1834 action, but in full preclinical animal toxicology studies
1835 this dark candidate significantly elevated tumor potential in

1836 rats. Development of this candidate was immediately
1837 discontinued.

1838 Even though both analogs were fully characterized, an
1839 animal study was required to demonstrate that this seemingly
1840 minor difference had enormous consequences for important
1841 safety characteristics. Minor differences can have major
1842 safety consequences.

1843 Secondly, pre-clinical and laboratory tests are not
1844 sufficient to determine immunogenicity and other important
1845 safety parameters. Human clinical immunogenicity data must
1846 be required, and we have numerous examples illustrating its
1847 vital importance.

1848 While developing a complete new process for our insulin
1849 analog, we discussed this program with the FDA. FDA stated
1850 the no general safety threshold could be applied for new
1851 impurities. Even one as low as .1 percent was not acceptable
1852 because proteins can be immunogenic at very low
1853 concentrations, and it is not known when low is low enough.
1854 Immunogenicity data from an appropriate clinical study was,
1855 therefore, necessary and included in our submission.

1856 Thirdly, current science does not support
1857 interchangeability. Based on today's science, a follow-on
1858 biologic cannot be determined to be the same as a innovator
1859 drug. For this reason and because of the potential
1860 difference in immunogenicity and other drug-specific adverse

1861 events, follow-on biologic products must not be allowed to be
1862 interchangeable. The treating physician must at all times be
1863 involved in the decision to change from one product to
1864 another.

1865 Interchangeability is also not part of the EMEA
1866 approval, and Europe has the further requirement that these
1867 products are clearly identified to support post-market
1868 monitoring.

1869 Nova Nordisk believes that any pathway for follow-on
1870 biologics must be, first and foremost, constructed to protect
1871 patient safety, be rooted in the best science, preserve
1872 innovation, and respect proprietary information.

1873 Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today. Nova
1874 Nordisk is ready to assist Congress as this issue moves
1875 forward.

1876 [Prepared statement of Ms. Mollerup follows:]

1877 ***** INSERT *****

1878 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Ms. Mollerup.
1879 Dr. Venkataraman, we are pleased to have you with us?

1880 STATEMENT OF GANESH VENKATARAMAN

1881 Mr. VENKATARAMAN. Good morning, Chairman Waxman and
1882 members of the Committee. I want to thank you for the
1883 invitation and opportunity to present to you this morning on
1884 this very important topic to our industry and for the general
1885 public.

1886 I am Ganesh Venkataraman, Co-Founder and Senior Vice
1887 President of Research at Momenta Pharmaceuticals. I am
1888 pleased to come before you today to discuss the scientific
1889 issues behind the need to create an abbreviated regulatory
1890 approval process for generic biologics, which are defined as
1891 follow-on protein products in Dr. Woodcock's testimony.

1892 The terms that I use are also defined in the written
1893 testimony that we are submitting for the record.

1894 Mr. Chairman, I am a chemical engineer by training, with
1895 specific expertise in bioprocess engineering, protein
1896 structure characterization, and analytic and quantitative
1897 methods for categorizing complex mixtures. While at MIT I,
1898 with Dr. Sasisekharan and Dr. Langer developed novel analytic
1899 technology that enables characterization of complex mixtures.

1900 With this platform and co-science and leadership at MIT, we
1901 founded Momenta. We develop novel drugs and generic versions
1902 of complex products. We use cutting edge science to develop
1903 affordable and safe generic versions of these products.

1904 Momenta has a strong interest in ensuring that Congress
1905 acts this year. We believe our company's experience
1906 demonstrates that the science is available today and
1907 continues to evolve to enable generic versions of complex
1908 mixture drugs.

1909 In my written testimony I focused on five major issues
1910 that I will briefly discuss today.

1911 First point, complex biologics can be totally
1912 characterized. Not all biologic products are the same, so
1913 when we discuss the characterization challenges we must keep
1914 in mind the continuum of complexity. Analytic technologies
1915 are here today to characterize the less-complex biologics,
1916 and approaches like ours and others are actively being
1917 developed for those that are more complex.

1918 In my testimony I highlight how our testimony is applied
1919 to heparins. While heparins are not biologics, it validates
1920 how complex mixtures can be characterized.

1921 The second point is: with such product
1922 characterization, generic companies will be able to design
1923 and control the manufacturing process to reproducibly make
1924 biologic drugs with the same quality as the branded

1925 companies. The manufacturing process for biologic drugs does
1926 not occur in random or uncontrolled system. The living cells
1927 are highly specialized systems which, in a very careful and
1928 controlled manner, produce a final product.

1929 Scientific advances in analytical technologies available
1930 to the generic as well as the branded industries allow one to
1931 link process parameters to the final product. It is possible
1932 and absolutely critical that generic companies build and
1933 maintain the same level of process knowledge.

1934 Point three: clinical studies, ranging from small-scale
1935 PK to clinical outcome studies, should be used to address any
1936 residual uncertainty answering relevant scientific questions.
1937 Traditional empirical or full-scale clinical trials must not
1938 be a requirement for approval in all cases. While the FDA
1939 may require full-scale trials for approval of some biologics,
1940 others that have increased level of characterization data
1941 should require significantly reduced clinical testing.

1942 We believe FDA is well equipped to work with applicants
1943 to determine the degree of testing necessary and define the
1944 characterization and trial requirements.

1945 Point four: biologic drugs can be designed to be
1946 interchangeable. Interchangeability is an important public
1947 health objective and products need to be designed and proved
1948 to be interchangeable. It is well within the reach in the
1949 near term for a number of products. This can be done through

1950 total characterization and/or through a proper combination of
1951 characterization and clinical trials.

1952 Point five: patient safety and product quality will not
1953 be jeopardized. We should hold the entire industry, branded
1954 and generic, alike, to the highest scientific standards, and
1955 allow the expertise of FDA's scientific staff, which will
1956 approve and oversee the marketing of innovator and generic
1957 biologics.

1958 In closing, Mr. Chairman, there is an opportunity to
1959 drive continued scientific innovation by creating a
1960 forward-looking, regulated system which balances the
1961 respective roles that characterization and clinical data
1962 should play. FDA has to be given the opportunity to make the
1963 decisions that on comparability which is interchangeability
1964 based on the science presented to them. If legislation does
1965 not allow for such a pathway today, scientific innovation
1966 from technology companies like ours and many others will be
1967 stifled, and access to more-affordable choices would be
1968 denied.

1969 I hope that my perspectives will be instructive to this
1970 debate. I am confident that these efforts under your
1971 leadership will be a key contributor to increasing access to
1972 safe, effective, and affordable medications to patients in
1973 need.

1974 I thank you again for the opportunity to submit

1975 testimony. I look forward to answering any questions.

1976 [Prepared statement of Mr. Venkataraman follows:]

1977 ***** INSERT *****

1978 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Venkataraman.
1979 To begin the questioning, the Chair recognizes Mr.
1980 Burton.

1981 Mr. BURTON. I thank the Chair for recognizing me. I
1982 have to go put a pharmaceutical in my eye out at the
1983 hospital, so I can attest to the necessity for those
1984 products.

1985 Mr. Chairman, I am not sure this question should be
1986 directed to the panel. It may be directed at you. From
1987 everything I have seen, there can be a minor difference in a
1988 biological product, and if the pharmaceutical company that
1989 created the product in the first place has to give a generic
1990 company the information before their patent expires, it seems
1991 to me, because of the minor difference that could be created
1992 by the generic company, they could apply for a license well
1993 before the patent runs out from the original producer. If
1994 that were the case, the scientific research being paid for by
1995 the original patent company, the pharmaceutical company that
1996 developed the product, they could lose their investment after
1997 they have created something that is going to be beneficial to
1998 everybody.

1999 So my question is: has that been checked out legally
2000 and whether or not the originating company can be protected
2001 for the duration of their patent?

2002 Chairman WAXMAN. Perhaps we can let one of the panelists

2003 answer it, but it seems to me it becomes a patent question.
2004 If the originator of the product has a patent over that
2005 product, a minor variation, as you seem to describe it, would
2006 not be permitted as a competitor, if it is basically the same
2007 product.

2008 Mr. BURTON. I think the bill has a great deal of merit.

2009 Chairman WAXMAN. Which is, of course, by the way, what
2010 we do right now with generics and brand name drugs. We allow
2011 generics to compete after the patent is over. If there is a
2012 new innovation in it or a minor difference, then the FDA
2013 would have to decide if it is, in fact, a generic.

2014 Mr. BURTON. I understand that. I like the bill. That
2015 is one thing I would like to check out. Thank you, and thank
2016 you for yielding.

2017 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much.

2018 The Chair recognizes himself.

2019 Let me address this question to Dr. Gerrard and Dr.
2020 Schwieterman. As you testified, for over ten years the FDA
2021 health as allowed brand name manufactures of biotech drugs to
2022 make changes in the process by which they manufacture their
2023 products, but without repeating the original safety and
2024 effectiveness trials. This policy seems to me to undercut
2025 the brand name industry argument that changes in
2026 manufacturing processes can affect safety and effectiveness
2027 in ways that could only be assessed through clinical trials.

2028 In your judgment and experience, does permitting companies to
2029 make significant manufacturing changes under a comparability
2030 protocol, but without repeating clinical trials, adequately
2031 protect patients from unsafe or ineffective products?

2032 Ms. GERRARD. I think, as both Dr. Woodcock and Dr.
2033 Schwieterman have said, FDA only has one standard for safety
2034 and efficacy, so when FDA makes the decision that, after a
2035 manufacturing change, that the product is comparable, they
2036 have decided that it is going to have the same safety and
2037 efficacy as the brand. What we are saying is some of those
2038 same principles apply to the development of generic biotech
2039 products.

2040 Chairman WAXMAN. Yes.

2041 Mr. SCHWIETERMAN. Yes, let me just add to that. The FDA
2042 is a science-based organization. It is filled with
2043 scientists. It is filled with physician reviewers. It is
2044 filled with people who are expert in data analysis and
2045 interpretation. Your question really is one of is the
2046 science there to allow in some cases for the absence of
2047 clinical trials, and I would say yes, it is there, but you
2048 would have to look at the data, you would have to look at the
2049 techniques, you would have to look at the actual agent under
2050 discussion. You take things on a case-by-case basis, based
2051 upon the science and the data, and then make that
2052 determination.

2053 Chairman WAXMAN. Are there many examples of products
2054 approved under comparability protocols that turned out to
2055 have unpredicted safety or effectiveness problems that were
2056 only discovered after marketing?

2057 Mr. SCHWIETERMAN. There are none in the U.S. where there
2058 were major changes in post-marketing that caused this. We all
2059 know the example of Eprex, which occurred post-marketing in
2060 Europe. The patients developed PRCA. But the Agency and the
2061 biotechnology industry and biopharmaceutical industry in this
2062 country has been amazingly good at protecting the public this
2063 way.

2064 Chairman WAXMAN. Does the scientific rationale
2065 underlying comparability protocols and FDA's ten years of
2066 experience implementing it provide evidence that an
2067 abbreviated application process for follow-on proteins and
2068 biogenerics based on established comparability principles
2069 could adequately protect patients from unsafe or ineffective
2070 products? Dr. Gerrard?

2071 Ms. GERRARD. I think the comparability policies have
2072 been enormously successful from FDA's point, and the American
2073 public has benefitted, as well. Brand companies have been
2074 able to make manufacturing changes and improve their product
2075 without the need to redo clinical trials.

2076 I think we can apply some of those same principles in
2077 extending it one step further to generic biotech products.

2078 Mr. SCHWIETERMAN. I would just like to add that I think
2079 the rationale is, in fact, one that can be used, coupled with
2080 the data, coupled with the case-by-case to develop a safe and
2081 effective biogeneric use of the principles we outlined.

2082 Chairman WAXMAN. Dr. Schwieterman, Ms. Mollerup
2083 testified that immunogenicity can arise so unpredictably from
2084 changes in biologics that a follow-on biologic will always
2085 require a clinical trial to assess immunogenicity. When a
2086 brand name company uses the FDA's comparability guidance to
2087 make changes to its existing biologic products, are clinical
2088 trials always required to demonstrate that no new
2089 immunogenicity concerns have arisen?

2090 Mr. SCHWIETERMAN. Always is an absolute, and absolutes
2091 are only things that can be supported by the data. FDA is a
2092 scientific organization, and I would say that no. In every
2093 instance ought there be a clinical trial for immunogenicity?
2094 No. It would depend upon the nature of the case. It would
2095 depend on the data that are there. And I think there are
2096 ways and methods for sure beyond clinical trials to determine
2097 immunogenicity. In fact, clinical trials, themselves, have
2098 limitations in this regard, as they do with other infrequent
2099 safety AEs.

2100 Chairman WAXMAN. Should there be more concern about
2101 immunogenicity for follow-on proteins than for brand name
2102 proteins?

2103 Mr. SCHWIETERMAN. I don't think there should be more or
2104 less concern about immunogenicity. I think that the safety
2105 of all agents, particularly biogenerics and
2106 biopharmaceuticals in this country is a critical issue for
2107 the FDA. I think that the same standards, the same kinds of
2108 oversight, the same considerations for biogenerics ought to
2109 apply for them as to do for present-day biopharmaceuticals.

2110 Chairman WAXMAN. Let me ask a question of Dr.
2111 Venkataraman and Dr. Allan. A number of companies have
2112 expressed doubts about whether copies of biotech drugs can be
2113 made safely. They have suggested that the manufacturing
2114 process for producing these drugs is so complex that new
2115 companies will not understand biologics manufacturing well
2116 enough to produce safe versions of these products. Isn't it
2117 true that there are a number of companies who already make
2118 brand name biotech drugs, either for themselves or on
2119 contract for other companies, who would be likely to want to
2120 make copies for biotech drugs if there were a legal pathway?

2121 Mr. ALLAN. I believe there are contract manufacturing
2122 organizations that do make branded products, either at the
2123 research level, the development stage level, or even at the
2124 commercial level.

2125 Chairman WAXMAN. Yes.

2126 Mr. VENKATARAMAN. I would like to add I think the brand
2127 manufacturers sometimes have made the process to be a black

2128 | box. I think the science is there now to be able to go back
2129 | and decouple product and relationship to the process so that
2130 | you could use a different cell line and come up with a
2131 | different process that would ultimately provide you the same
2132 | end product. Provided you couple that with the
2133 | characterization of looking at process-related impurities and
2134 | end product, you could get there to the same level of being
2135 | in a brand manufacturer.

2136 | Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much.

2137 | Mr. Davis?

2138 | Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Waxman.

2139 | Ms. Mollerup, let me start with you. The generic system
2140 | we created for pharmaceutical drugs in 1984, which bears Mr.
2141 | Waxman's name, balanced and abbreviated approval systems for
2142 | generic drugs with patent restoration and new exclusivity for
2143 | innovators. Doesn't such a critical balance continue to
2144 | stimulate the development of new cures for drugs, having that
2145 | balance?

2146 | Ms. MOLLERUP. In my mind it is important that we keep
2147 | the balance that will still foster innovation, and as this
2148 | process goes forward towards defining a legislative and
2149 | regulatory system, that that is acknowledged, because you
2150 | would still want new drugs to come on the market in this
2151 | country.

2152 | Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. What kind of impact would a

2153 system that fails to assure safety or sustain innovator
2154 intellectual property rights have on innovation?

2155 Ms. MOLLERUP. A system that would fail to protect safety
2156 I think would be detrimental for both innovation and
2157 follow-on manufactures, and obviously first and foremost for
2158 public health. I think it is very important, as Congress
2159 moves forward, that the pathway you are moving towards is
2160 really constructed to protect patient safety and be rooted in
2161 the best science, and there is a lot of strong and good
2162 science available for this.

2163 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. The FDA stated in its testimony
2164 that demonstrating the similarity of a follow-on protein
2165 product to a reference product is more complex and would
2166 require new data. I guess my question is: does this mean
2167 FDA should require clinical safety data for follow-on
2168 biologics, or do you think there are cases where they could
2169 make the determination it wouldn't?

2170 Ms. MOLLERUP. Based on my experience with those complete
2171 second-generation processes that we have developed and are
2172 developing at Nova Nordisk, these require immunogenicity data
2173 in all cases for the simpler ones like insulin, described in
2174 my testimony. Besides that, PKPD was required to assess both
2175 pharmacokinetics and efficacy for a more complex one like a
2176 co-correlation factor, substantial clinical data will be
2177 required, as well as immunogenicity.

2178 So, based on the experience that we have with processes
2179 that are less substantial in the change that they involve
2180 than doing a follow-on, from my standpoint, where the science
2181 is today, immunogenicity trials will always be required.

2182 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you.

2183 Let me ask Dr. Venkataraman and Dr. Allan, you are both
2184 from small biotech companies. FDA stated in their testimony
2185 that technology is today not yet sufficient to allow for
2186 comparisons of complex protein products. Do you agree with
2187 that?

2188 Mr. ALLAN. Well, it has to be viewed on a case-by-case
2189 basis. I think for the product we developed the analytical
2190 methodology that we used, which was fairly extensive, was
2191 very adequate to demonstrate the structural characterization
2192 of the property.

2193 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. DO you think it depends?

2194 Mr. ALLAN. It will depend on the products. There are
2195 some proteins that are fairly simple, relatively speaking,
2196 and you can characterize them extremely well.

2197 Mr. VENKATARAMAN. I agree. I think on a case-by-case
2198 basis there are several proteins that can be characterized
2199 well today, and science continues to evolve. Academic groups
2200 and other companies I know are working very actively towards
2201 creating novel technologies to be able to do this for more
2202 complicated products. And I think a regulatory and a legal

2203 legislative incentive is going to propel that technology
2204 forward much faster to be able to do this much more
2205 sophisticatedly.

2206 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. How close are we, do you think?
2207 It is hard to say, I know, but a couple years, ten years?

2208 Mr. VENKATARAMAN. It is difficult to say, but four years
2209 ago, when we started working on the program that we were,
2210 people thought it was impossible to do. We were discouraged
2211 extremely. Today we have an application, we have talked to
2212 the FDA. It has been completely solved. I think similar
2213 situations have been reported by other people. So it is a
2214 matter of providing the right incentives for the scientists
2215 to be able to take it on.

2216 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Okay. Are there any non-clinical
2217 tests or technologies that could fully substitute for
2218 studying the safety of biotech products in humans?

2219 Mr. VENKATARAMAN. I would say that the safety, per se,
2220 so the comparability of the two products, characterization
2221 becomes a very important aspect of knowing how close you are
2222 to the innovator product. I think there are multiple
2223 analytical techniques that provide you very rigorous
2224 estimation of the product quality and product attributes, so
2225 yes.

2226 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. All right.

2227 Let me ask Dr. Schwieterman and Ms. Gerrard, the FDA

2228 highlighted in its testimony the importance of ensuring that
2229 facilitating the development of follow-on product through
2230 abbreviated pathways doesn't discourage innovation and the
2231 development of new biological products. They also refer to
2232 the Hatch-Waxman Act as a balanced approach. Do you think an
2233 extension of data exclusivity period and certain patent
2234 protections would help encourage innovation and development
2235 with biological products?

2236 Ms. GERRARD. I am not a lawyer. I am a scientist. I
2237 guess I have confidence in the innovation biotech companies
2238 that I work with to continually come up with new and better
2239 products.

2240 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. All right. From a scientific
2241 point of view it is achievable, but from a policy point of
2242 view you are going to take a pass on it?

2243 Ms. GERRARD. I am not a lawyer. I am a scientist.

2244 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. That is fine.

2245 Mr. SCHWIETERMAN. I will take a pass, as well. I am a
2246 physician scientist. From a scientific point of view I agree
2247 with what Dr. Gerrard said.

2248 Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Well, Henry and I are both
2249 lawyers. Thank you.

2250 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Davis.

2251 Mr. Yarmuth?

2252 Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2253 As a child I was left way behind on science, so I am
2254 going to pass on the science questions for a minute and ask
2255 something I know a little bit more about, and that is the
2256 business side of this, and I am asking business questions of
2257 a panel of scientists. I understand that.

2258 Am I correct in assuming--and anyone can answer this--I
2259 take it, just reading between the lines, we have several
2260 representatives from generic manufacturing companies and one
2261 from a brand name company. Judging from what we have heard
2262 about the complexity of these biologic drugs as opposed to
2263 chemical-based drugs, and we all know the stories about how
2264 chemical-based drugs cost pennies apiece to produce and they
2265 are sold for whatever, but it seems to me that the economics
2266 of biologics are significantly different and more complex and
2267 therefore dramatically more expensive. If I am correct in
2268 that assumption and the process is inherently expensive, how
2269 much money can we save by producing them on the generic basis
2270 or follow-on basis as opposed to the brand name?

2271 I guess a premise, we know that for Claritin and for
2272 Zantac and all these other products, and many of the discuss
2273 that are actually still by prescription, that we have a
2274 significant amount spent for advertising and marketing. I
2275 assume marketing, anyway, is still a big component of the
2276 biologics business. But what are we talking about, either
2277 from a historical perspective that you know about or

2278 | potentially that we are talking about saving by allowing
2279 | these drugs to be produced generically?

2280 | Mr. ALLAN. I can give that a shot. Actually, I don't
2281 | think anybody around this table is from the generic industry.
2282 | Some of us are from the innovation biotechnology industry.

2283 | With regard to price, it is going to be a case-by-case
2284 | basis. There is no doubt to make a complex protein is more
2285 | expensive to make a small molecule. The manufacturing
2286 | facilities that are needed, the overhead, so to speak, that
2287 | goes into the whole program is probably larger than the
2288 | financial commitment you would want to make for a small
2289 | molecule plant. So I think intrinsically it is a more
2290 | expensive business, but I believe that, you know, certainly
2291 | none of us would be sitting around this table if we felt that
2292 | we couldn't make these types of products at a significant
2293 | price reduction to the innovator product. It will be a
2294 | case-by-case. What would be the percentage reduction I don't
2295 | think we could--I certainly would not comment on that right
2296 | now, but, as I said, it will be less expensive.

2297 | Mr. YARMUTH. Go ahead.

2298 | Mr. VENKATARAMAN. I was just going to add one comment. I
2299 | don't know if I can give you any numbers, but what I do know
2300 | is that the margins between the cost to manufacture to the
2301 | actual price are significant. I don't have exact numbers,
2302 | but it is quite significant, and I assume that that could

2303 | translate into cost savings in the long run.

2304 | Mr. YARMUTH. Again, I understand I am asking business
2305 | questions of scientists, but would the savings result,
2306 | assuming that we allow an easier pathway to producing
2307 | generics, would the savings result more from the competitive
2308 | aspect, or would they result from the fact that, just because
2309 | we have protected the brand name manufacturer, that we have
2310 | allowed that price to be very, very high, and that just by
2311 | eliminating the exclusive we bring the price down? Would the
2312 | savings be inherent? Would they be related to competition,
2313 | or is it just because we are allowing exorbitant profits now,
2314 | understanding that those profits are being allowed to allow
2315 | the company to recover some of its investment?

2316 | Mr. ALLAN. I think it will be the introduction of
2317 | competition, to a certain extent.

2318 | Ms. GERRARD. And my economic knowledge might be right
2319 | behind my legal knowledge, but I think what we have to
2320 | understand is that, while biologics might be more expensive
2321 | to make than drugs, that there is still a huge margin there,
2322 | and that, while the cost savings, even conservative estimates
2323 | that say 25 percent, which we have seen, when you consider
2324 | that the cost of a biologic is so high that a 25 percent
2325 | savings is a huge amount.

2326 | Mr. YARMUTH. You look like you want to answer.

2327 | Mr. VENKATARAMAN. The pricing for a drug that a company

2328 | like Momenta would launch as a generic would be lower by at
2329 | least 20, 25, 15, depends on the dynamics, but because the
2330 | lower prices of the drug I think the cost saving would be
2331 | achieved.

2332 | Mr. YARMUTH. Ms. Mollerup, did you want to comment?

2333 | Ms. MOLLERUP. Yes. I mean, cost is an important
2334 | consideration and I think that lower cost of drugs is good,
2335 | as long as it is not at the expense of patient safety. I
2336 | guess, again, back to the need for clinical trials, I would
2337 | like to share with you, which I guess indicates somewhat
2338 | where the borderline may be. In Europe we have not only had
2339 | two approvals of follow-ons, but also one rejection. That
2340 | was on an Interferon Alpha that did not show comparability in
2341 | its clinical trial in that more patients had relapse of their
2342 | disease after the treatment with Alferon was stopped,
2343 | compared to the reference product, and there were also more
2344 | side effects in the Alferon group. Again, I am neither an
2345 | economist. I am also a scientist, but it just goes back to
2346 | the equation of cost savings, that some cost savings can be
2347 | realized but the products are expensive to produce, and as
2348 | this example from Europe shows, care really has to be
2349 | exercised as to make sure that the appropriate comparable
2350 | clinical data, not a copy of the original data set that was
2351 | handed in, but appropriate comparable data ensuring
2352 | comparable efficacy and safety is included.

2353 Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you.

2354 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Yarmuth.

2355 Mr. Welch?

2356 Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2357 Dr. Gerrard, Dr. Mollerup argued that the risk of
2358 immunogenicity from a follow-on product must always be
2359 evaluated with clinical trials. That is my understanding of
2360 her testimony. In your view, are clinical trials the best or
2361 the most sensitive method of detecting this?

2362 Ms. GERRARD. Not always. I think we have to keep in
2363 mind that immunogenicity, as I stated, a product having
2364 greater immunogenicity really is not an issue; it is when
2365 there are clinical consequences. Immunogenicity just means
2366 you make antibodies to the product. Most of the time they
2367 are not neutralizing. Many times they are temporary.
2368 Patients continue to be treated. So it is not always an
2369 issue.

2370 Second, is clinical trial the best way to determine
2371 immunogenicity differences between two products? It may not
2372 always be the case. Sometimes more rigorous analytical
2373 comparisons, either assessment of the product and instability
2374 are really a much more sensitive way of determining whether
2375 that product is going to cause problems.

2376 Mr. WELCH. Thank you.

2377 Dr. Schwieterman, would you agree with that?

2378 Mr. SCHWIETERMAN. Yes, I would. I think the concept of
2379 immunogenicity is one that has been talked about a lot, but,
2380 in fact, it is a quite complex subject. There are certain
2381 kinds of immunogenicities, then there are other kinds. We
2382 have had many day-long conferences about this. The ability
2383 of clinical trials to detect immunogenicity depends on what
2384 you are talking about. For most of the things that have been
2385 bandied about, actually clinical trials are rather poor
2386 measures for picking up the kinds of outcomes that you have
2387 heard.

2388 Mr. WELCH. Thank you.

2389 I would ask this question to both of you, as well.
2390 Proponents of the generic biological pathway, as you know,
2391 always raise the example of Eprex, Johnson & Johnson's
2392 European version of Epogen. Can you explain a little bit
2393 about what happened with Eprex? I will start, I guess, with
2394 you, Dr. Schwieterman.

2395 Mr. SCHWIETERMAN. I don't know, of course, the data on
2396 the manufacturing changes that were made, nor was I privy to
2397 the investigations made. I know that Johnson & Johnson
2398 underwent a great deal of investigations. I mean, just to
2399 tell the story as I know from my standpoint, Eprex, which was
2400 one of the erythropoietin--ESAs, they are called, in general,
2401 erythropoietic stimulating agents--was marketed and approved
2402 overseas, and then cases of autoimmune disease or a very bad

2403 autoimmune immunogenic reaction to the drug, itself, ensued.
2404 In other words, the body started reacting to its own protein
2405 based upon that.

2406 The thing about this particular case that is different
2407 is that, number one, it occurred overseas, so, you know,
2408 there was no real knowledge of whether the analytic tests
2409 that were performed there were adequate or complete and
2410 whether they would have been picked up at the FDA.

2411 Number two, the ultimate investigation into this
2412 product, as I understand it from Dr. Segal's testimony
2413 several weeks ago, picked up on impurities that are actually
2414 determined with analytic tests after the fact, and most of
2415 the investigation ensued upon that; that is to say, the
2416 actual analysis of the product, itself.

2417 From my vantage point, it is clearly an important issue,
2418 because we need to understand it, but it doesn't visciate, it
2419 doesn't make the arguments about analytic tests weaker, in my
2420 estimation. In some ways it makes them stronger.

2421 Mr. WELCH. Go ahead, Dr. Gerrard.

2422 Ms. GERRARD. I was just going to add to that. Pure red
2423 cell pledget is a very serious disease, but it occurred in 1
2424 in 10,000 patients. So could this have been detected in a
2425 typical clinical trial of, say, several hundred people? No,
2426 it could not. What actually did resolve the issue for J&J's
2427 Eprex was a more rigorous analytical characterization to

2428 | resolve that problem.

2429 | Mr. WELCH. Thank you. How large a clinical trial would
2430 | have been required to identify that side effect?

2431 | Ms. MOLLERUP. I think that everyone agrees it would have
2432 | taken an extremely large clinical trial, and, from my
2433 | perspective, the purpose of doing these comparative
2434 | immunogenicity trials where you can, from the blood samples,
2435 | isolate antibodies, characterize them, find out whether they
2436 | are benign or not, and I fully agree with Dr. Gerrard that
2437 | not all antibody responses are a safety issue.

2438 | But with the case of these comparable clinical trials to
2439 | test immunogenicity, the real important point here is that
2440 | such trials can tell us if there is a major problem. For
2441 | innovator products, as well as for follow-ons, it is the
2442 | long-term safety monitoring that is also needed in order to
2443 | pick up on minor problems like this.

2444 | Mr. WELCH. How large a clinical trial would have been
2445 | required, then, Ms. Mollerup?

2446 | Ms. MOLLERUP. I don't have the clinical for Eprex
2447 | because I don't have that statistic, but, back to Dr. Segal's
2448 | testimony, it would take a study of about 50,000 patients to
2449 | have a good chance of detecting a serious effect in a
2450 | patient, 1 patient out of 1,000. But I don't have the
2451 | statistics on Eprex.

2452 | Mr. WELCH. And my understanding--anybody can answer

2453 | this--is that J&J, itself, doesn't argue that the Eprex
2454 | problem would have been avoided, in fact, had they conducted
2455 | a clinical trial before marketing the change product. Dr.
2456 | Gerrard?

2457 | Ms. GERRARD. No, they would not have detected it in a
2458 | clinical trial. Every product is subject to post-marketing
2459 | surveillance.

2460 | Mr. WELCH. Right.

2461 | Ms. GERRARD. So a very rigorous post-marketing
2462 | surveillance program is also important for every product.

2463 | Mr. WELCH. Dr. Schwieterman?

2464 | Mr. SCHWIETERMAN. One point I want to make is you don't
2465 | conduct clinical trials for no reason. You are exposing
2466 | patients to agents and putting them through a rigamorole and
2467 | data collection and blood drawing and so forth to collect
2468 | scientific data for scientific reasons that are
2469 | pre-established in hypotheses, and so to argue that clinical
2470 | trials should be conducted all the time is really to negate
2471 | the basic premise of a clinical trial, which is the study of
2472 | question.

2473 | In the case of Eprex, it would have been an impossibly
2474 | large study to have studied that particular issue; therefore,
2475 | a clinical trial not only would have been undetected,
2476 | insensitive to that particular change; it wouldn't have
2477 | offered any information at all.

2478 Mr. WELCH. Just following on your point, would it make
2479 scientific sense to argue that the express example supports a
2480 clinical trial requirement for follow-on products but does
2481 not support that same requirement for brand name products?

2482 Ms. MOLLERUP. I think, from looking at what is required
2483 for the branded industry, I mean, the trials that we
2484 undertake, both phase two and phase three trials,
2485 immunogenicity is an obvious part of that program, because we
2486 are working with proteins and the immunogenetic profile of
2487 our products are also not established as we take them through
2488 the clinical program, so that is certainly part of the
2489 testing we do, as well.

2490 Mr. WELCH. I'm not sure I understand you. You are
2491 saying that you have to have those clinical tests for the
2492 follow-on products but you don't have to have them for the
2493 brand name products?

2494 Ms. MOLLERUP. No. I am saying the exact opposite. I am
2495 saying that we, in the brand products in the clinical trials
2496 that we use to take these to the market, immunogenicity
2497 studies is an integrated component, and what we find
2498 reasonable to establish clinical comparability for the
2499 follow-ons is to also study immunogenicity in an
2500 appropriately sized comparative trial, and that will be a lot
2501 smaller than the innovator phase three studies.

2502 Mr. WELCH. Dr. Schwieterman, go ahead.

2503 Mr. SCHWIETERMAN. I guess I would disagree with that.
2504 Mandated clinical trials to study immunogenicity is not
2505 something that is scientific, but rather political. In this
2506 particular case, if the science are there, depending upon the
2507 drug, depending upon the question, the patient, and the test,
2508 you could do a clinical study in certain instances where you
2509 believed that information would be useful from that clinical
2510 study. But to mandate it for all studies would be to also
2511 perform it for those cases where it wouldn't be useful.

2512 I think that what ought to happen is that the FDA, like
2513 they do now, be able to have the flexibility and the
2514 authority to use their assessments of the data and the
2515 context of that data to make judgments about the need for
2516 further clinical studies.

2517 Mr. WELCH. Thank you.

2518 Dr. Gerrard, last word?

2519 Ms. GERRARD. I will just add to that. I think FDA does
2520 need that flexibility. You look at the history of the
2521 product, have there been any clinical consequences to the
2522 immunogenicity? What about the analytical characterization?
2523 You look at the whole picture. If there are remaining
2524 questions, of course safety is paramount. We want FDA to
2525 have the ability to request any additional data that they
2526 need to make sure that that is a safe product.

2527 Mr. WELCH. Thank you. I yield the balance of my time.

2528 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Welch.

2529 Dr. Mollerup, would you support giving FDA the ability
2530 to require and enforce post-market studies for both the
2531 generic and for the brand name drugs?

2532 Ms. MOLLERUP. I am from Europe, so I have a fair amount
2533 of knowledge of the regulatory system here in the U.S., but
2534 may not be accurate on all the details. From my perspective,
2535 the FDA should be able to put the same requirements to both
2536 innovators and follow-ons, because same safety issues are
2537 involved.

2538 Chairman WAXMAN. Right. In the United States the
2539 manufacturer agrees when the product is licensed to do
2540 follow-up tests for post-marketing, but they may not do it
2541 because there is not a sanction except to take them off the
2542 market, which has never been used. Do you think FDA should
2543 have the power to require post-marketing safety studies? You
2544 say it should be for both or either when it is necessary. Do
2545 you think FDA ought to have that power?

2546 Ms. MOLLERUP. The power not only to ask for the data,
2547 but also actually to get it?

2548 Chairman WAXMAN. And to insist it be done?

2549 Ms. MOLLERUP. Yes, I think they should.

2550 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you.

2551 Well, I thank all of you very much. You have been very
2552 helpful, and I appreciate your testimony. This may be

2553 self-serving, but the bill does allow FDA to require clinical
2554 trials. It allows FDA to do whatever is necessary to
2555 determine that the science indicates a generic version is
2556 safe and effective.

2557 Thank you very much.

2558 I want to call forward the witnesses for our third
2559 panel.

2560 Yvonne Brown is an individual living with multiple
2561 sclerosis and is speaking today on behalf of the National
2562 Multiple Sclerosis Society.

2563 Mary Nathan is an individual living with a rare disease
2564 called Gaucher Disease, and is speaking today on behalf of
2565 the National Organization for Rare Disorders.

2566 Nelda Barnett is a Board Member for AARP.

2567 Priya Mathur is the Vice Chair of Health Benefits, Board
2568 of Administration, at the California Public Employees'
2569 Retirement System, CalPERS.

2570 Scott McKibbin is the Special Advocate for Prescription
2571 Drugs for the State of Illinois.

2572 Dr. Henry Grabowski is a Professor of Economics and the
2573 Director of the Program in Pharmaceuticals and Health
2574 Economics at Duke University.

2575 Jonah Houts is a Senior Analyst at Express Scripts,
2576 Inc., a pharmacy benefit management company, PBM,
2577 representing 1,600 clients, including large, self-insured

2578 employers, government payers, union, and health insurance
2579 companies, and covering more than 50 million people.

2580 We welcome you all to this hearing today. Your prepared
2581 statements will be in the record in full. We would like to
2582 ask each of you to limit the oral presentation to around five
2583 minutes.

2584 It is the custom of this Committee, as you have already
2585 observed, having sat through the earlier panels, to ask all
2586 of the witnesses to be sworn in, so I would like to ask each
2587 of you to rise and raise your right hand.

2588 [witnesses sworn.]

2589 Chairman WAXMAN. The record will indicate that each of
2590 the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

2591 Ms. Brown, why don't we start with you, if you have the
2592 microphone passed over.

2593 The timer, by the way, will be green, and then it will
2594 turn to yellow for the last full minute, and then red when
2595 that last minute is up.

2596 Thank you so much for being here.

2597 STATEMENTS OF YVONNE BROWN, FOR THE NATIONAL MULTIPLE
2598 SCLEROSIS SOCIETY; MARY NATHAN, FOR THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION
2599 FOR RARE DISORDERS (NORD); NELDA BARNETT, BOARD MEMBER, AARP;
2600 PRIYA MATHUR, VICE CHAIR, HEALTH BENEFITS-BOARD OF
2601 ADMINISTRATION, CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT
2602 SYSTEM (CALPERS); SCOTT D. MC KIBBIN, SPECIAL ADVOCATE FOR
2603 PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, STATE OF ILLINOIS; HENRY GRABOWSKI, PH.D,
2604 PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, DIRECTOR, PROGRAM IN PHARMACEUTICALS
2605 AND HEALTH ECONOMICS, DUKE UNIVERSITY; AND JONAH HOUTS,
2606 SENIOR ANALYST, EXPRESS SCRIPTS, INC.

2607 STATEMENT OF YVONNE BROWN

2608 Ms. BROWN. Thank you, Chairman Waxman and distinguished
2609 members of the Committee, for inviting me to provide
2610 testimony at this hearing, and thank you, Chairman Waxman,
2611 for your leadership on this issue.

2612 My name is Yvonne Brown. I live in Waldorf, Maryland.
2613 I have multiple sclerosis, or MS. I am not a pharmaceutical
2614 company. I am not a lobbyist. I am simply a 44-year-old
2615 woman who struggles every day with the devastating effects of
2616 MS and the unaffordable cost of treatment.

2617 MS is chronic, it is unpredictable, often disabling
2618 disease of the central nervous system. It basically stops

2619 people from moving in one way or another. There is no cure.
2620 MS causes loss of coordination, memory, extreme fatigue,
2621 paralysis, blindness, and many other symptoms. These
2622 problems can be permanent or they can come and go.

2623 More than 400,000 Americans have MS, and every hour
2624 someone is newly diagnosed. The National Multiple Sclerosis
2625 Society recommends treatment with one of the FDA approved
2626 disease modifying drugs to lessen the frequency and severity
2627 of attacks and to help slow the progression of disability.
2628 Unfortunately, the cost is often financially devastating. I
2629 know this personally.

2630 Four of the six FDA approved disease modifying drugs are
2631 considered biological drugs. They range from \$16,000 to
2632 \$25,000 a year. That is about twice the amount of Social
2633 Security disability I receive annually. For me, sometimes
2634 the financial struggle to get my treatment can be troubling,
2635 more troubling than this incurable disease.

2636 I am here today to appeal to the Committee. My personal
2637 story is an example of the immediate need for this
2638 legislation that Chairman Waxman has introduced.

2639 In the past I have struggled a lot with my MS and with
2640 trying to get the prescriptions I need to feel a little
2641 better. I was diagnosed with MS in April of 2000 at 37 years
2642 old. In August, 2000, I was prescribed Avonex, a biological
2643 drug from Biogen. The cost of Avonex is high, and I did

2644 whatever I could to afford my prescribed therapy. I sold my
2645 computer, I disconnected my phone, I skipped paying a lot of
2646 my bills. Despite this, I lost my home before the end of
2647 2001 and I was living in my car. From 2001 to 2005 I was
2648 homeless.

2649 I struggled for years to get approval from Social
2650 Security and I tried for over three years to be approved for
2651 subsidized housing. I was even turned down for help at
2652 shelters because of my MS. The staff there felt that I was a
2653 health liability due to my problems with balance and frequent
2654 falls. I became accustomed to begging, borrowing, and
2655 pleading for any help so I could get treatment.

2656 Unfortunately, access to my treatment was sporadic and I
2657 paid the consequences with increased symptoms and more
2658 frequent attacks. It was a terrible cycle. As a result of
2659 not having access to Avonex for an extended period of time in
2660 2004 I was hospitalized. The cost of my 24 hour hospital
2661 stay was nearly \$1,000. I am still trying to pay that bill.

2662 Today, after finally being approved for Social Security
2663 disability, I receive \$1,100 a month, and I am covered under
2664 Medicare. I have coverage for my medications, but my
2665 co-payment is \$220 a month just for Avonex. When you only
2666 have \$1,100 a month to live on, \$220 might as well be \$220
2667 million.

2668 I don't want to be homeless or live in my car again, so

2669 I cannot miss rent. I don't want to risk my health, so I
2670 cannot skip too many meals. I often skip paying bills, but I
2671 cannot get too far behind or risk losing my electricity or
2672 other vital services. And I do my best to pay my share to
2673 those who provide my treatments. Even today I must miss my
2674 treatments occasionally. There is simply nothing I can do
2675 sometimes.

2676 It is a misconception that help is readily available.
2677 Existing programs are often difficult to navigate, have
2678 varying criteria, take a long time, and sometimes run out of
2679 money. For example, last year I was finally approved for
2680 assistance by the National Organization for Rare Disorders.
2681 Before I received my assistance they ran out of funding. It
2682 was also possible to get assistance sometimes from
2683 Biogenidec. After asking them for help over a year ago, I
2684 think I am close to getting help with coverage during the
2685 Medicare part D donut hole, which I will already enter in
2686 April. I learned my lesson, though. This time I know not to
2687 count my chickens before they hatch.

2688 As a person with MS, I take other prescription drugs for
2689 hypertension, depression, and several supplements. The
2690 difference is that the generics are available. This keeps my
2691 co-payments low and manageable. Most importantly, I do not
2692 have to miss these treatments because I cannot afford them.
2693 But this is not true for my MS therapies and never will be

2694 unless something changes.

2695 Hopefully you can help with a solution. I am a person
2696 with a chronic, life-long, costly disease, but I want to stay
2697 out of a wheelchair, I want to stay out of the hospital, I
2698 want to contribute my talents to the community, I want to pay
2699 my taxes, I want to be healthy so I am able to help others
2700 who have MS. I want to stay on my treatment. If I don't
2701 have access to treatments, my health will decline.

2702 The stress from the story I have told you, which I live
2703 with, has caused me to begin to lose my hair. Frankly, I
2704 don't really care. I just want to battle this beast that is
2705 trying to take away my movement.

2706 My story is not unique. Millions rely on biologic
2707 drugs. Millions struggle terribly with the cost. If I can
2708 leave this Committee with one thought, it is that no matter
2709 how good a drug is supposed to be, it has not chance of being
2710 effective if it is not affordable to those who need it.

2711 For a long time no treatments were available for MS.
2712 Now there are. The sad thing is it doesn't matter. Some
2713 people just can't afford them. The cost is too much. We
2714 have to change that. This legislation has the power to move
2715 us a little closer. We all know that providing more
2716 affordable medications for all Americans is a serious
2717 priority. For biologic MS therapies, we will never, ever
2718 reach that goal if we don't start by simply providing the

2719 pathway. It is a necessary first step.

2720 Thank you again for your invitation and attention. I
2721 hope you remember me and people like me as you consider this
2722 legislation. Please help provide more affordable biological
2723 drugs for those who desperately need them. Help establish a
2724 regulatory pathway for the FDA to review and approve
2725 follow-on biological therapies.

2726 Thank you.

2727 [Prepared statement of Ms. Brown follows:]

2728 ***** INSERT *****

2729 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Ms. Brown.
2730 Ms. Nathan.

2731 STATEMENT OF MARY NATHAN

2732 Ms. NATHAN. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of
2733 the Committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to
2734 testify before you today. My name is Mary Nathan, and I am
2735 affected by Gaucher disease.

2736 As one of 4,800 people being treated worldwide with
2737 Cerezym, I understand, in a very practical way, what it
2738 means to be alive because of a recombinant biological
2739 medicine. I also understand what happens when the cost of a
2740 life-saving drug is unaffordable.

2741 Gaucher disease is a rare genetic disorder classified
2742 into three categories and characterized by the deficiency of
2743 an enzyme necessary to break down fats called glycolipids.
2744 Because the enzyme is in short supply, lipids collect in the
2745 spleen, liver, bone marrow, and other organs. Left
2746 unchecked, the accumulation of lipids causes problems such as
2747 anemia, bleeding, organ dysfunction, and abdominal
2748 enlargement, deterioration of the joints and bones, breathing
2749 problems, fatigue, and reduced ability to fight common
2750 infections. Type I is the most common. It strikes 1 in

2751 40,000 people in the general population, and 1 in 600 Jews of
2752 Eastern European origin.

2753 When I was diagnosed in 1966 at the age of 11, very
2754 little was known about Gaucher Disease. Given the increased
2755 size of my spleen and my low blood count, doctors scheduled
2756 me for a splenectomy within weeks of my diagnosis. Shortly
2757 after that I was hospitalized with a high fever, excruciating
2758 pain, and an inability to walk. We learned later that lipids
2759 had migrated quickly to my bones, since the doctors had
2760 removed my spleen. We also learned that I had experienced a
2761 Gaucher bone crisis, a painful episode that would repeat
2762 often as my disease progressed.

2763 By the time I entered college there was little doubt
2764 that I had a severe form of what is known as Type I Gaucher
2765 Disease. At the age of 23 I underwent orthopedic surgery to
2766 straighten my leg and replace my destroyed hip. After a long
2767 recovery I was able to walk without pain for the first time
2768 in years. This respite lasted until 1988, when the implanted
2769 prosthesis became painful and unstable, so again I underwent
2770 surgery and began to experience complications that left me
2771 fighting for my life.

2772 My red blood cell count was dangerously low due to a
2773 reaction, depriving my bones of oxygen. I then began to
2774 experience an ongoing cascade of bone infarcts, vertebrae
2775 fractures, and a serious fracture of my other hip.

2776 To head off further damage, my doctor suggested a
2777 surgery of last resort known as a girdlestone procedure to
2778 repair my hip. Few patients ever walk again after this
2779 procedure.

2780 What happened next marked a historic medical
2781 breakthrough that would change the course of my life and my
2782 disease. After 30 years of intensive scientific research,
2783 scientists at the National Institutes of Health discovered a
2784 treatment for Gaucher Disease, and in April, 1991, the Food
2785 and Drug Administration approved a commercial version called
2786 Ceredase.

2787 After three years of enzyme replacement therapy, my
2788 overall health improved to a point where reconstructive hip
2789 surgery was possible. In November, 1994, after seven years
2790 in a wheelchair, I took my first real steps.

2791 There is no question in my mind that I am alive today
2792 because of the orphan drug Ceredase. What concerns many of
2793 us, however, is that the miracle drug is priced out of the
2794 reach of individuals, and thus poses unprecedented challenges
2795 for patients who need the drug, for the doctors who treat us,
2796 for employers struggling with the high cost of health
2797 insurance, and for insurers and Government programs helping
2798 to pay our medical bills.

2799 In 1994 most patients were converted to Cerezyme, the
2800 Genzyme Corporation's newly approved orphan drug, to replace

2801 Ceredase. The cost of Cerezyme differs from patient to
2802 patient because dosages are based on body weight. My dosing
2803 regimen is 60 units per kilogram of body weight for infusion.
2804 At 130 pounds, my treatment runs about \$12,600 per
2805 administration, or about \$300,000 a year for 24 doses. An
2806 additional \$25,000 in cost is added for administering the
2807 drug and testing and monitoring my response and overall
2808 health. This brings the cost for all charges related to my
2809 treatment to over \$328,000 a year. Now, over a 16-year
2810 period since its approval in 1991, I estimate that the
2811 payments for my drug have reached well over \$4.5 million.

2812 In conclusion, the wave of the future in medicine is
2813 biotechnology to treat rare diseases like mine and those
2814 diseases affecting wider populations. There is no reason why
2815 biogenerics cannot take their rightful place in America's
2816 marketplace alongside generic drugs.

2817 Based on some estimates, it is said that biogenerics
2818 could save between 10 percent and 20 percent. If that holds
2819 true, millions of dollars could be saved annually just for
2820 the 4,800 patients currently on Cerezyme.

2821 Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you personally for
2822 introducing your legislation. It is time to make safe and
2823 effective life-saving biotech therapies accessible and
2824 affordable to the millions who need them.

2825 The Access to Life-Saving Medicines Act will create

2826 competition in the marketplace and, in turn, foster
2827 innovation. Hopefully a balance will be struck that
2828 encourages innovation yet allows more affordable follow-on
2829 biologics to come to the marketplace.

2830 Thank you for your time and attention to my testimony.

2831 [Prepared statement of Ms. Nathan follows:]

2832 ***** INSERT *****

2833 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Ms. Nathan.
2834 Ms. Barnett?
2835 Ms. NATHAN. You are welcome.

2836 STATEMENT OF NELDA BARNETT

2837 Ms. BARNETT. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee,
2838 I am Nelda Barnett of AARP's Board of Directors. AARP
2839 appreciates the opportunity to testify in support of creating
2840 a pathway for generic biologics.

2841 AARP has endorsed the Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act
2842 because we believe this legislation will enable the FDA to
2843 establish a process for the approval of safe, comparable, and
2844 interchangeable versions of biologics. We call on Congress
2845 to pass the legislation this year.

2846 Biologics are used every day to treat serious diseases
2847 such as cancer, multiple sclerosis, anemia, and rheumatoid
2848 arthritis. While biologics hold great promise for treating
2849 some of the most serious diseases, these treatments can be
2850 expensive, costing tens and hundreds of thousands of dollars.
2851 Some people are fortunate enough to have insurance coverage
2852 or the means to be able to afford these medications, but many
2853 are not so lucky.

2854 Nothing illustrates how important it is that we have a

2855 pathway to lower-cost generic versions than the stories of
2856 millions of Americans who currently cannot afford a
2857 high-priced biologic drugs, such as we have just heard.

2858 My colleague on AARP's board of directors, Bonnie
2859 Cramer, could not be here today, but she has asked that I
2860 share with you one particular story. Bonnie suffers from
2861 severe rheumatoid arthritis, and over the years has undergone
2862 a variety of treatment options, including a biologic drug,
2863 Enbrel, which has helped her. Bonnie has encountered many
2864 people who suffer from her condition who are not able to
2865 afford medication. One particular woman was so affected by
2866 the disease that her fingers were gnarled and she had
2867 difficulty walking and used all of her energy just to get
2868 through the day. This woman recounted how she was trying to
2869 find a way to get access to Enbrel but could not due to the
2870 high cost of the drug.

2871 Bonnie tells it best in her own words. She says,
2872 ''Having lived with this disease for 40 years, I know how
2873 incapacitating it can be and how the pain can be unbearable.
2874 I know what hope biologics can give to someone whose life is
2875 affected. To know that it cannot be obtained by other people
2876 with deadly diseases is brutal. How do you tell someone that
2877 they cannot have a treatment that may alter their lives
2878 significantly?''

2879 The astronomical cost of these drugs not only impacts

2880 consumers, but also health care payers such as employers,
2881 private health care plans, public programs such as Medicare
2882 and Medicaid. One way to control these costs is to provide a
2883 pathway for the approval of generic versions of these drugs.
2884 Any prescription drug therapy treatment must be affordable
2885 and safe in order to be effective for individuals. H.R. 1038
2886 leaves the scientific determinations up to those who are best
2887 equipped to address them, the FDA. Common sense, alone, tell
2888 us that this agency has the scientific knowledge to approve
2889 the brand name biologics, surely has the ability to provide a
2890 pathway for generic approval of the same biologic.

2891 The Hatch-Waxman Act created a pathway for FDA to
2892 approve generic prescription drugs. Twenty-three years later
2893 the time has come for generic approval of biologics. H.R.
2894 1038 provides FDA the authority to produce the safe,
2895 comparable, or interchangeable version of the biologic. Our
2896 members and all Americans need Congress to enact this
2897 bipartisan legislation this year. We are pleased to see this
2898 Committee and Members from both Houses of Congress and both
2899 sides of the aisle moving forward on this issue.

2900 Thank you again for inviting us here. I am happy to
2901 answer any questions.

2902 [Prepared statement of Ms. Barnett follows:]

2903 ***** INSERT *****

2904 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Ms. Barnett.
2905 Ms. Mathur?

2906 STATEMENT OF PRIYA MATHUR

2907 Ms. MATHUR. Good afternoon. Mr. Chairman and members of
2908 the Committee, I commend you for convening today's hearing
2909 and for the introduction of bipartisan legislation to enable
2910 consumer petition in the biopharmaceutical marketplace.

2911 On behalf of the California Public Employees' Retirement
2912 System, or CalPERS, I welcome the opportunity to testify
2913 about this issue of importance to our members, to our State,
2914 and to our Nation.

2915 Let me begin by introducing myself and CalPERS. My name
2916 is Priya Mathur, and I was elected by 400,000 public sector
2917 employees to serve on the board of CalPERS, to invest their
2918 \$230 billion of retirement assets, and to manage their
2919 multi-billion-dollar health care program.

2920 CalPERS' health program covers 1.2 million active and
2921 retired public employees and their families. Notably,
2922 CalPERS is the third-largest purchaser of employee benefits
2923 in the Nation, behind only the Federal Government and General
2924 Motors, and it is the largest purchaser of health benefits in
2925 California.

2926 This year CalPERS will spend almost \$5 billion on health
2927 benefits, or \$13.4 million per day. Of that amount, CalPERS,
2928 for the first time, will spend over \$1 billion on members'
2929 prescription drugs. At a time when our State is trying to
2930 expand health insurance coverage to more Californians, slow
2931 the rate of growth in health care costs, and make our health
2932 care system more efficient, the high cost of
2933 biopharmaceutical products presents an unsustainable
2934 challenge to calPERS and to our entire health care system.

2935 CalPERS has long been a leader in implementing cost
2936 effective health care programs. Among many strategies, we
2937 have instituted innovation prescription drug benefit
2938 cost-sharing designs to maximize the use of generics and
2939 therapeutically appropriate brand drugs. CalPERS has
2940 actually achieved tremendous success in controlling
2941 prescription drug costs through the use of generics. This
2942 has been possible thanks to the chairman, whose efforts two
2943 decades ago led to the enactment of the Drug Price
2944 Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, what we
2945 call Waxman-Hatch.

2946 As you well know, Waxman-Hatch gave the FDA the
2947 authority to provide an abbreviated approval process for
2948 those products deemed equivalent to an innovator product
2949 after patent expiration. Without generic substitution, we
2950 estimate that our costs would be about 60 percent higher than

2951 they are today. Generics save our enrollees and our State
2952 taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars every year.

2953 In spite of all of our cost containment efforts, CalPERS
2954 has seen an average annual increase of about 13.5 percent for
2955 our HMO and PPO products since 2002.

2956 Mr. Chairman, CalPERS' spending for biotech products is
2957 distressingly substantial and rising at a rate that is
2958 significantly higher than traditional pharmaceuticals.
2959 Because of the complex delivery requirements of many
2960 biopharmaceuticals, it is exceedingly difficult to break out
2961 a stand-alone spending line for these products. However, we
2962 believe that our spending on so-called specialty drugs is a
2963 good proxy, because biotech products make up the great
2964 majority of spending in the specialty drug category.

2965 Total spending for specialty drugs was \$83.7 million in
2966 2006, a one-year increase of 16.9 percent, compared to a 5.4
2967 percent increase in traditional prescription drugs. On
2968 average, spending for biotech products was at least \$55 per
2969 day, compared to traditional drugs at only \$2 per day.

2970 CalPERS supports a competitive health care marketplace
2971 that leads to innovation and life-saving medicines; however,
2972 competition does not exist today because the FDA asserts that
2973 it does not have the authority to approve biogeneric
2974 products. As a result, today's biotech companies are
2975 benefitting long after patents expire and are profiting at

2976 the expense of all Americans.

2977 CalPERS supports giving the FDA explicit authority to
2978 approve biogeneric products that are safe. Without the
2979 ability to access less-expensive comparable and
2980 interchangeable biopharmaceuticals, calPERS ultimately will
2981 be forced to raise prescription drug co-pays or raise
2982 premiums, shifting the increasingly unaffordable costs onto
2983 the individuals who can least afford them.

2984 Mr. Chairman, before I conclude I need to address one
2985 important issue. The opponents of this legislation--as you
2986 point out, they are limited to the biotech industry--are
2987 claiming that those who support your legislation are ignoring
2988 the safety threat of bringing biogenerics to the marketplace.
2989 I want to be perfectly clear. The safety and health of our
2990 members comes first in any decision we make on any health
2991 care policy. Therefore, we strongly support providing FDA
2992 with full discretion to make the ultimate decision about
2993 whether and when any prescription drug product, be it brand
2994 or generic, comes to market. Your legislation does just
2995 that.

2996 Mr. Chairman, CalPERS is proud to add our support to the
2997 growing and diverse list of stakeholders who support your
2998 legislation to open the door to biogeneric competition.
2999 Thank you for giving us this opportunity.

3000 I would be happy to answer any questions.

3001 [Prepared statement of Ms. Mathur follows:]

3002 ***** INSERT *****

3003 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much for your testimony.
3004 We are going to ask questions after everybody is
3005 finished.

3006 Mr. McKibbin?

3007 STATEMENT OF SCOTT MCKIBBIN

3008 Mr. MCKIBBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
3009 the opportunity to speak on behalf of Illinois Governor Rod
3010 R. Blagojevich in support of establishing a pathway for
3011 generic biopharmaceuticals.

3012 I want to applaud Chairman Waxman for his vision,
3013 recognizing that escalating cost of biopharmaceuticals to
3014 States and consumers is creating an economic burden on
3015 Illinoisans and State budgets nationwide. These costs will
3016 continue to make it more difficult to balance cost control
3017 and access for patients to affordable, life-saving
3018 biopharmaceuticals, both in Illinois and in the Nation as a
3019 whole.

3020 Further, I would like to recognize Illinois Congressman
3021 Emmanuel for his cosponsorship of H.R. 1038, the Access to
3022 Life-Savings Medicine Act, and for supporting these important
3023 measures.

3024 In my present role as a Special Advocate for

3025 Prescription Drugs, I have functional accountability for
3026 overseeing prescription drug spending for the State of
3027 Illinois. I am also a two-time kidney cancer survivor, and
3028 can speak personally from experience on both the value and
3029 the cost of therapies that treat such dreaded diseases as
3030 cancer.

3031 I want to make it clear that I have a dual role as
3032 Special Advocate. The State of Illinois, as every State, has
3033 a responsibility to ensure that prescription drug
3034 pharmaceuticals available to consumers are safe and
3035 effective, so I would like to dispense with the issue of
3036 safety as a given for the discussion of generic legislation.

3037 While some in this debate are seeking to obscure the
3038 real issue with inflammatory rhetoric about the potential
3039 lack of safety of generic biopharmaceuticals, it is my
3040 position that this legislation authorizes FDA to take those
3041 scientifically sound steps that are appropriate to ensure the
3042 safety of generic biopharmaceuticals.

3043 I want to focus the bulk of my testimony on the reality
3044 of biopharmaceutical costs and the value of generic
3045 competition in this arena.

3046 Illinois is a partner with the Federal Government in
3047 providing and paying for prescription drugs. We are also
3048 responsible for providing and nurturing a sound economy in
3049 our State, one that does not allow health care costs to

3050 bankrupt our State or to negatively impact employers or the
3051 overall business climate of our State. To this end, Governor
3052 Blagojevich has introduced a comprehensive program to expand
3053 coverage to the 1.4 million uninsured between the ages of 19
3054 and 64, and to offer relief to many of our residents who
3055 struggle every day to pay for health care costs covered under
3056 the existing insurance plans.

3057 There is some debate as to whether the annual increase
3058 of the cost of biopharmaceuticals is 15, 17, or 20 percent,
3059 but the difference is, in fact, not material. If, as I
3060 believe and my data will show, these expenditures for
3061 products are rising at an average of slightly larger than 15
3062 percent annually, then within five years what Illinois spends
3063 on these drugs today will double. That would have a dramatic
3064 negative effect. We would not be able to afford these
3065 medications.

3066 Many States probably don't realize the depth of what
3067 they are spending now on biopharmaceuticals. According to
3068 IMS, biopharmaceutical sales in 2006 grew to \$40.3 billion.
3069 While the spending has escalated, a debate over potential for
3070 generic biopharmaceuticals has spanned four FDA
3071 Commissioners, all with a variety of prioritization on how to
3072 establish a biopharmaceutical generic approval process.

3073 States need more than continued discussion on this
3074 issue. We need action. Chairman Waxman's bill is a great

3075 first step in actually getting us on the road to creating a
3076 framework to permit generic competition and the savings it
3077 will create.

3078 To understand the breadth and impact of spending on
3079 biopharmaceuticals for Illinois, we examined the leading
3080 products and what the State of Illinois spends on these
3081 products. The results were staggering.

3082 For our 227,500 member employee retiree group, the State
3083 of Illinois spent \$33.2 million on a select list of
3084 approximately 100 biopharmaceuticals during the fiscal year
3085 that just ended July 2006. With that trend, this represents
3086 over 12 percent of our entire cost for drugs, and is growing
3087 at an astronomical rate both on the price and the utilization
3088 side of the ledger. The ingredient cost increase was 49.9
3089 percent, and the plan cost per member was 50.3 percent.

3090 The number of prescriptions for this select list of
3091 biopharmaceuticals also rose significantly, a nearly 29
3092 percent increase. For programs administered under the State
3093 Medicaid Agency, we have seen similar cost and utilization
3094 increases, but on a much larger scale. For the most recent
3095 year in which data is available, the cost of 61
3096 biopharmaceuticals was \$1,662,000, paid for under the
3097 pharmacy benefit side, and an estimated \$75 million paid for
3098 under the medical and the part D wrap-around program. The
3099 grand total exceeded \$200 million a year, without trend.

3100 Now, much has been said about the potential cost savings
3101 of generic competition. Opponents to creating a pathway for
3102 generic competition argue that the cost savings may be only
3103 10 or 20 percent. But let's look at the worst case scenario,
3104 a 10 percent savings. If Illinois was able to reduce its 15
3105 percent, 16 percent annual increase in spending on
3106 biopharmaceuticals by even 10 percent, then we not only
3107 extend our ability to pay for these drugs, but we also extend
3108 our ability to continue, under State programs, to provide
3109 increased access to them.

3110 The other issue to consider about savings is this--it
3111 appears an obvious one from my perspective, but seems lost in
3112 this debate. In the past year, biopharmaceutical
3113 expenditures have increased at double digit rates. If we do
3114 nothing for the rest of 2007, we will end the year even
3115 higher expenditures associated with those biopharmaceuticals.

3116 Every day that we delay in creating a pathway for generic
3117 competition is a day of potential lost cost savings to
3118 States, to taxpayers, and to consumers. We can not afford to
3119 wait any longer to begin the savings, even if, as opponents
3120 predict, the savings would initially only be modest.

3121 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. McKibbin. Are
3122 you just about to conclude?

3123 Mr. MCKIBBIN. I have just a few more words, Mr.
3124 Chairman.

3125 Chairman WAXMAN. Okay.

3126 Mr. MCKIBBIN. I appreciate it.

3127 I would just like to urge Congress to approve this
3128 legislation to authorize the FDA to apply sound scientific
3129 regulatory criteria that would give Illinois and other States
3130 and every consumer and taxpayer lower biopharmaceutical
3131 products and increased access, the result from the cost
3132 savings.

3133 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3134 [Prepared statement of Mr. McKibbin follows:]

3135 ***** INSERT *****

3136 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much for your testimony.

3137 Dr. Grabowski?

3138 STATEMENT OF HENRY GRABOWSKI

3139 Mr. GRABOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of
3140 the Committee. I am Henry Grabowski, Professor of Economics
3141 at Duke University.

3142 My comments will focus on the differences between
3143 generic drugs and follow-on biologics and how these
3144 differences affect the expected budgetary savings. I also
3145 discuss the importance of data exclusivity for innovation
3146 incentives. With my colleagues, I have examined these issues
3147 in two recent peer reviewed studies. I will make these
3148 studies available for the record, along with my statement.

3149 Based on our analysis, we conclude that the cost of
3150 entry will be significantly higher for follow-on biologics
3151 than generic drugs. We expect fewer firms will enter, and
3152 average prices will decline less for follow-on biologics.
3153 Consequently, conservative budgetary scoring is appropriate
3154 in terms of expected savings to the Government and to other
3155 payers.

3156 Second, in designing a pathway for follow-on biologics
3157 it is also very important that Congress balance price

3158 competition and innovation incentives. In this regard, it is
3159 important to include in the legislation a data exclusivity
3160 period that takes account of the high cost and risk of
3161 developing new entities. My statement provides data from a
3162 new study that is peer reviewed and co-authored with Joe
3163 DiMasi in this regard. The cost of R&D for a representative
3164 new biologic is now over \$1 billion when one takes account of
3165 preclinical and clinical expenditures, the cost of failures,
3166 the cost of capital, and process engineering, which is higher
3167 for biologics than pharmaceuticals.

3168 So let me now briefly summarize some of the key
3169 differences between follow-on biologics and pharmaceuticals
3170 that will affect cost savings in scoring procedures.

3171 The first is clinical trial cost. As we have heard
3172 earlier today, some clinical trial data is going to be
3173 necessary to demonstrate comparable safety and efficacy, at
3174 least for the foreseeable future. In the case of European
3175 filings, the estimates range from \$10 to \$40 million for
3176 preclinical studies. This contrasts with \$1 to \$2 million
3177 costs for bioequivalents for generic drugs.

3178 Second is development times. Estimates from generic
3179 firms indicate development times for a follow-on biologic are
3180 likely to range from five to eight years. By comparison,
3181 generic drugs seldom require more than a few years to do
3182 required tests and gain regulatory approval.

3183 Third is manufacturing cost and risk. The required
3184 capital investment in property, plant, and equipment and the
3185 cost of manufacture are also likely to be significantly
3186 higher for follow-on biologics.

3187 Fourth, there are important differences on the demand
3188 side. It is unlikely that most follow-on drugs will be
3189 designated as interchangeable by the FDA, at least not for
3190 the foreseeable future and without extensive clinical trials.

3191 As a result, we expect the physicians will initially be
3192 cautious with respect to the substitution of follow-on
3193 products. Health care providers and patients are likely to be
3194 wary until clinical experience has accumulated and shown that
3195 a follow-on product is a satisfactory therapeutic alternative
3196 to the original innovator products.

3197 These costs and demand side differences have important
3198 implications for entry and price competition. In our
3199 research, we find the number of entrants and the priced
3200 discounts of a follow-on biologic are highly sensitive to
3201 fixed cost. As a consequence, even very large-selling
3202 biologics are likely to have only a few entrants. For
3203 markets with only one to three entrants, we project price
3204 discounts will be in the range of 10 to 25 percent. This is
3205 in accordance with European experience to date.

3206 These differences also have important implications for
3207 scoring cost savings. In particular, cost saving estimates

3208 | based on the experiences of generic drug utilization and
3209 | pricing are subject to strong upward biases. A correct
3210 | accounting of this and all other relevant factors would
3211 | substantially lower the savings estimates in studies such as
3212 | that by Express Scripts and the PCMA.

3213 | A recent analysis by Avalier Health has very different
3214 | assumptions in some important dimensions, find much lower
3215 | cost savings.

3216 | The remainder of my statement covers R&D costs and
3217 | innovation incentives. I understand the bills under
3218 | consideration have no data exclusivity provisions or patent
3219 | restoration features for innovators. The fact that there is
3220 | no data exclusivity provision would allow generic firms to
3221 | challenge innovators' patents from the date of first
3222 | marketing approval and to enter the market soon thereafter.
3223 | The resulting uncertainty in IP litigation would have
3224 | significant negative incentive effects on capital market
3225 | decisions for private and public biotech firms with
3226 | pipelines. Many of these firms are entrepreneurial in nature
3227 | and have few if any profitable products.

3228 | The exclusivity period for pharmaceuticals under
3229 | Hatch-Waxman is five years. R&D costs have increased
3230 | substantially since Hatch-Waxman was enacted 20 years ago.
3231 | Five years does not provide enough time for firms to recoup
3232 | the high cost of discovering and developing a new medicine.

3233 Break-even returns on R&D for the average new drug and
3234 biological product now exceed more than a decade.

3235 Since this legislation will essentially define the terms
3236 of competition between innovators and imitators for decades
3237 to come, it is critical that it maintains strong incentives
3238 for R&D investment in new biopharmaceuticals, as well as
3239 provide incentives for price competition.

3240 A data exclusivity period of at least ten years in
3241 length would recognize the high cost and risk of developing
3242 new biological entities and deter patent challengers from
3243 occurring and entering until a more mature phase of the
3244 product life cycle. This would also preserve incentives for
3245 the development of new indications for existing drugs and
3246 harmonize United States law with that of the European Union.

3247 Thank you.

3248 [Prepared statement of Mr. Grabowski follows:]

3249 ***** INSERT *****

3250 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Grabowski.
3251 Mr. Houts?

3252 STATEMENT OF JONAH HOUTS

3253 Mr. HOUTS. Good afternoon, Chairman Waxman and fellow
3254 Committee members. My name is Jonah Houts. I am a Senior
3255 Analyst with Express Scripts. I am pleased to be here today
3256 to discuss the issue of biogenerics from the perspective of a
3257 leading pharmacy benefit management company. Express Scripts
3258 would like to thank the chairman for his leadership in
3259 introducing this legislation, which we believe will
3260 fundamentally improve health outcomes by giving patients
3261 access to lower-cost biological alternatives..

3262 Express Scripts monitors prescription drug trends and
3263 expenditures for 1,600 clients, including large self-insured
3264 employers, government payers, unions, and health insurance
3265 companies. I would like to talk about three basic issues
3266 today. First, I would like to speak about the trend of
3267 specialty drug spend, especially biologic agents. Second, I
3268 would like to describe the tools used by the PBM industry to
3269 control the increase in cost of prescription drugs. Third, I
3270 would like to describe how we would apply these tools to
3271 biogenerics and the potential benefit to patients, plan

3272 sponsors, and the Government.

3273 Spending on pharmaceuticals now represents 11 percent of
3274 total health care spend. Within the pharmaceuticals are
3275 specialty drugs. These are the most high-priced biologic
3276 agents which we are discussing here today.

3277 I brought an exhibit which may demonstrate the increased
3278 growth here. In 2006, spending on specialty drugs was \$54
3279 billion, representing 20 percent of pharmaceutical spend.
3280 The rate for specialty drugs will almost double by 2010 to
3281 \$99 billion. This rate of increase is the second highest in
3282 all of the health care field, exceeded only by diagnostic
3283 imaging tests.

3284 In total, Express Scripts manages the pharmacy benefit
3285 for over 50 million individuals in this country. Our mission
3286 is to make the use of prescription drugs safer and more
3287 affordable. To this end, we have developed sophisticated
3288 tools, such as formularies, tiered co-payments, step
3289 therapies, and drug utilization management programs, just to
3290 name a few. These tools promote the most clinically sound
3291 and cost effective use of pharmaceuticals.

3292 One of the most potent tools that we have is the
3293 promotion of generic medications. These therapies are time
3294 tested and thus are clinically effective. They also have
3295 well characterized safety profiles. The additional advantage
3296 is that they are the most affordable for both patients and

3297 plan sponsors. For these reasons, patients achieve higher
3298 compliance rates with these therapies. Utilizing programs
3299 like I previously described, our company has an industry
3300 leading generic fill rate of 60 percent.

3301 But it is important to recognize that all of our
3302 programs for promoting the use of generics or less expensive
3303 branded medications are reviewed by our external pharmacy and
3304 therapeutics committee. This committee is made up of both
3305 specialty and general medicine doctors, and pharmacists who
3306 are not employees of Express Scripts. Safety has and always
3307 will be of primary concern to Express Scripts.

3308 As we have stated, spend on biologic agents is
3309 increasing at an alarming rate. This legislation will allow
3310 for a pathway at the FDA for companies to bring to market
3311 generic versions of these important medications.

3312 The PBMs have the tools to assist patients in switching
3313 to the most cost-effective biogenerics. In fact, our
3314 switching tools will be even more effective in this market
3315 because of the limited number of patients, the limited number
3316 of prescriptions, the limited prescribing community, and the
3317 potential for enormous savings. Our plan sponsors will be
3318 very motivated to have us pursue each and every savings
3319 opportunity.

3320 We are pleased to hear the FDA today not rule out
3321 interchangeability in the future, but, regardless, if the FDA

3322 | deems a product is interchangeable or just comparable will be
3323 | quite effective at working with the prescribing physician to
3324 | aid patients in receiving the most cost-effective and
3325 | clinically appropriate therapy.

3326 | In the realm of branded pharmaceuticals, drugs compete
3327 | on their research and development and marketing. It would be
3328 | irrational for branded drugs to compete on price, as they are
3329 | competing within a finite group of patients, and price
3330 | reductions would result in reduced revenues for all
3331 | manufacturers in the class. Generic drugs, however, can only
3332 | compete on price. Without this extensive research and
3333 | development, the only way for a generic to capture market
3334 | share is on price. This price competition benefits payers,
3335 | plans, and the Government.

3336 | This historic legislation would allow patients, payers,
3337 | physicians, and PBMs to work together to make these wonderful
3338 | therapies more available, with improved health outcomes and
3339 | tremendous savings.

3340 | [Prepared statement of Mr. Houts follows:]

3341 | ***** INSERT *****

3342 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Houts.

3343 I want to thank all of you for your testimony,
3344 especially Ms. Brown and Ms. Nathan. Your very moving
3345 testimony is what this legislation is all about. When drugs
3346 are miracles, but the miracles are too expensive for people,
3347 they are not going to be there for them, and that is why we
3348 need to figure out a way to hold down costs. Providing
3349 generics is certainly, to me, one of the best ways to hold
3350 down costs. Others have suggested other ideas, but
3351 competition, market forces I think do work and have worked in
3352 the past.

3353 Ms. Mathur, I find it stunning that in California
3354 spending on biologics or specialty drugs in 2006 was \$83.7
3355 million, and that is at a cost of \$55 per day, compared to \$2
3356 per day for traditional drugs. If those kinds of spending
3357 trends are maintained, what will be the impact on CalPERS and
3358 your members in the future?

3359 Ms. MATHUR. I think we really are at unsustainable
3360 levels, and what we fear is that in the future we will have
3361 to shift more of the cost on to the member, either through
3362 increase in co-pays or raising premiums. We have already
3363 heard stories from some of our members that, as the cost of
3364 health care increases overall, they are less and less able to
3365 afford health care, even through our program. I would hate
3366 to see some of our members drop health care coverage that is

3367 available to them simply because they cannot afford it.

3368 Chairman WAXMAN. Dr. Grabowski asserts that the savings
3369 from generic competition in the biologics context will be
3370 modest, in the range of 10 to 25 percent. Waft would even
3371 those modest savings mean for CalPERS? And let me ask this
3372 also of Mr. McKibbin for Illinois.

3373 Ms. MATHUR. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman. I thought you were
3374 directing that to Mr. Grabowski.

3375 Chairman WAXMAN. The 10 to 25 percent savings, Dr.
3376 Grabowski says those are modest.

3377 Ms. MATHUR. Yes.

3378 Chairman WAXMAN. What will that mean, however?

3379 Ms. MATHUR. I think it would be extremely significant. I
3380 mean, the cost for some members, \$300,000 a year, 10 to 15
3381 percent or 10 to 25 percent is a significant savings. So
3382 even though on a percentage basis the savings for biotech
3383 drugs or biogenerics might be less than for synthetic drugs,
3384 it is certainly, on an aggregate total cost basis, it is
3385 going to be a very large number.

3386 Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. McKibbin?

3387 Mr. MCKIBBIN. For Illinois, Mr. Chairman, we are talking
3388 about \$20 to \$50 million, depending on when we start it, if
3389 we start it this year. And those are numbers that come out
3390 of the base, so, as you know, if this trend continues at 15
3391 percent plus, we, too, like California, will reach this point

3392 | where it is not sustainable, so we will either have to make
3393 | those tough choices of trying to pass more costs or to limit
3394 | access, which is untenable.

3395 | Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you.

3396 | Mr. Houts, one of the frequent assertions we hear from
3397 | BIO, the trade association for the brand name biotech drugs,
3398 | is that when a generic pathway for biologics is established
3399 | we are not going to see much in the way of savings because
3400 | generic biologics won't be interchangeable like they are with
3401 | traditional generic drugs. Obviously, we might disagree on
3402 | the number of biologics that will end up being
3403 | interchangeable, but assuming BIO is correct that a high
3404 | number of biologics will be just comparable instead of
3405 | interchangeable, what kind of impact will that have on
3406 | spending on biologics?

3407 | Mr. HOUTS. There is still a significant savings
3408 | opportunity, even if interchangeability is not granted by the
3409 | FDA. Managed care plans and the PBMs, a recent example would
3410 | be in the statin market, where there was a high-priced,
3411 | effective statin, Statin A, and then a lower-priced and still
3412 | effective Statin B. While they were different chemical
3413 | entities, we were able to move market share to the
3414 | cost-effective product.

3415 | We were actually able to move 49 percent of the market
3416 | share where they weren't interchangeable, as you will. And

3417 | so there is still a significant opportunity in the area of
3418 | biologics to move patients to the preferred safe, effective,
3419 | cost-effective products.

3420 | Chairman WAXMAN. Well, you said it would be safe. When
3421 | therapeutic switches are made, what process is in place to
3422 | protect patient safety?

3423 | Mr. HOUTS. All of those decisions are reviewed by our
3424 | pharmacy and therapeutics committee that I referred to in my
3425 | testimony, and this is composed of specialist physicians, and
3426 | other physicians to ensure that drugs in those classes will
3427 | have no adverse effects on patients.

3428 | Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much.

3429 | Mr. Danny Davis?

3430 | Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Thank you very much, Mr.
3431 | Chairman.

3432 | Once again, let me thank you for calling and conducting
3433 | this hearing. It has, indeed, been informative, and I want
3434 | to thank all of the witnesses for their testimony.
3435 | Especially I want to echo the sentiments that you expressed,
3436 | Mr. Chairman, relative to the impact of the testimony of Ms.
3437 | Brown and Ms. Nathan, consumers for whom all of us work, and
3438 | hopefully, as a result of their experiences and their
3439 | testimony, it heightens the recognition that we must do
3440 | something, and do it as quickly as possible, to try and make
3441 | sure that we have available the very best and the most cost

3442 effective medical care that the Country can provide. So I
3443 certainly want to again thank both of you for being here and
3444 for your testimony.

3445 Mr. McKibbin, let me just commend the Governor for the
3446 State of Illinois. When I see the kind of interest that Rod
3447 Blagojevich has shown relative to health care, and especially
3448 the effort to try and make sure that pharmaceuticals are
3449 available to all of our residents at a cost for which they
3450 can pay, it makes me proud to live in the State of Illinois
3451 and proud to know that he is, indeed, our Governor. Please
3452 convey that to him.

3453 Mr. MCKIBBIN. I will.

3454 Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. If I could direct your attention
3455 to the chart located over here, which shows the five largest
3456 Medicare Part B drug expenditures in 2005--and you may not be
3457 able to see, but listed are all of the medicines listed of
3458 biotech drugs that are regulated as biologics. Spending on
3459 Epogen, an anemia treatment, alone, was over \$1.7 billion,
3460 but it was actually even higher than that, because those
3461 numbers on the chart do not include spending on the end-stage
3462 renal disease, ESRD program. Three of the other drugs are
3463 also anemia treatments, and they collectively represent over
3464 \$2.1 billion in Medicare spending. Remicade, an arthritis
3465 medicine, accounted for \$541 million.

3466 My question is: are we seeing those same kind of trends

3467 in the State of Illinois? And in terms of State spending,
3468 what are the five top biologics in the State of Illinois?

3469 Mr. MCKIBBIN. Well, Congressman, we are seeing those
3470 similar type of numbers, and anyone who has a television will
3471 recognize those drugs because they are fairly heavily
3472 advertised, but those five drugs on your screen, I did a
3473 quick analysis and for those we are talking about \$23 million
3474 a year, a little over \$23 million for those five drugs on
3475 your particular chart.

3476 For us, I took a look at the top five for just our State
3477 employee retiree group, and those top five were Enbrel,
3478 Humira, Avonex--which was talked about earlier--Lantus, and
3479 Forteo. Those were the top five drugs from a total dollar
3480 amount. On a per patient basis they are slightly different,
3481 but those five drugs are our top five, and not dissimilar to
3482 your chart. In some cases the difference may be because of
3483 Medicare and where Medicare may cover, versus an employee
3484 group, but we are seeing those similar types of trends.

3485 Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. I know that all of us throughout
3486 the Country moan and groan and talk about the speculation of
3487 Medicare and Medicaid and whether or not there are going to
3488 be increases or decreases. Many of the hospitals kind of
3489 operate on shaky ground every year. They are wondering
3490 whether or not they are going to experience severe cuts.

3491 Are they going to have to close departments or, in some

3492 instances, actually go out of business. Should we continue
3493 to see the increase in pharmaceutical drug costs, what impact
3494 do you think that would have on the hospitals, for example,
3495 in the State of Illinois, as well as throughout the Nation?

3496 Mr. MCKIBBIN. Certainly, Congressman, it could be the
3497 tipping point, and that is something that we are very
3498 concerned about. I know yourself and others in the
3499 delegation are concerned, and we would urge that this
3500 legislation be passed sooner rather than later. As I said
3501 earlier, you know, that trend am the, every day that goes by
3502 is a day that is a lost opportunity, and it may be, in fact,
3503 a tipping point for hospitals in the Illinois, metro Chicago,
3504 and the rest of the United States.

3505 Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Mr. Chairman, I see that the
3506 light is on, but could I ask Mr. Houts if he could respond to
3507 that same question relative to the continued escalation of
3508 pharmaceutical costs without relief, how this will affect the
3509 Medicare/Medicaid programs, and certainly their impact on our
3510 hospital infrastructures?

3511 Mr. HOUTS. It is not really a field of expertise for me
3512 as far as government payers. What I can say is that there is
3513 an exceptional opportunity for the Government in terms of
3514 Part B and end-stage renal disease, especially looking at
3515 those top drugs listed there, to save a pronounced amount of
3516 money. And so, as you consider this legislation, you may

3517 want to find ways to make Part B and the ESRD program more
3518 comparable to the commercially insured market and adopt some
3519 of the tools we use to manage trend.

3520 Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Well thank you very much.

3521 Mr. Chairman, again, I just simply want to commend you
3522 for your insight in introducing this legislation, the
3523 leadership that you continue to provide. I have always known
3524 of your strong interest in health care. You probably would
3525 not remember it, but way back in a different life when I used
3526 to come to D.C. to lobby on behalf of the National
3527 Association of Community Health Centers, you were always the
3528 person that we felt that we could come to you and get some
3529 understanding. I mean, Senator Kennedy over in the Senate and
3530 Representative Waxman here in the House, you were our guys.
3531 I want to thank you again.

3532 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you. Now you are one of their
3533 guys, too. Thank you for your kind comments.

3534 I very much appreciate all of our witnesses in this
3535 panel, as in the previous panels.

3536 I would like to ask unanimous consent that all Members
3537 have five days to submit additional questions for the record
3538 to the witnesses that have appeared before us today.

3539 That concludes our hearing, and our meeting is
3540 adjourned. Thank you very much.

3541 [Whereupon, at 1:29 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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